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2Americans have created the most expensive litigation system in the world. We are
incapable of trying medium sized lawsuits at lesser costs than the amounts in controversy.1 Our 
system lengthens large lawsuits so that potential jurors who have businesses or professions 
cannot serve.2 It produces results that depend upon issues unrelated to the merits.3 The outcomes 
and even the processes are unpredictable, with adverse effects upon both adjudication and 
settlement.4 There are many reasons for these effects, but the rules of evidence are a major 
contributor to them.5
Therefore, this article considers the case for selectively abolishing existing exclusionary 
principles in the Rules of Evidence. It is not a call for total abolition, because these principles are 
too firmly entrenched for that, and they have justifications that remain persuasive in some 
instances.  Furthermore, there are some rules, particularly in the 400 series of Federal Rules and
in principles governing privileges, that require retention, at least in a modified form. It is healthy, 
however, to consider whether some parts of the existing complex of rules may cost more than the 
value of any benefits they provide. It should be added that this article is not a call for 
reinstatement of the common law of evidence that governed before the Rules.  I believe that 
* John B. Neibel Professor of Law, University of Houston.  A.B., Harvard College; J.D., University of Texas.
1 See generally, e.g., DAVID CRUMP & JEFFREY B. BERMAN, THE STORY OF A CIVIL SUIT: 
DOMINGUEZ V. SCOTT’S FOOD STORE (3d ed. 2001) (tracing history of slip-and-fall trial and appeal in which 
cumulative attorney’s fees far exceeded plaintiff’s modest award) [hereinafter cited as CRUMP, CIVIL CASE].
2 Cf. DAVID CRUMP et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 556, 559 n.5 (4th ed. 2001) 
(excerpting and describing voir dire examination in multibillion-dollar litigation with predicted length of “many 
weeks” in which managerial and professional members of venire sought to be excused; showing judge’s efforts to 
keep “responsible people” on jury).
3 See, e.g., Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (N.D. 1970); see also infra Pt. IIA of this article (discussing result in 
Leake, which depended upon application of the hearsay rule, not the merits).
4
 For an eye-opening example of the disconnect between outcomes and merits, see Alexander, Do the Merits 
Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991) (concluding that 
securities litigations settle for consistent percentages of projected damages, irrespective of their merits, apparently 
because parties regard outcomes at trial as unpredictable and untrustworthy).
5 See infra Pts. IB-C, VIIB of this article (illustrating complexity and cost effects of the rules).
3some of our exclusionary rules are dysfunctional irrespective of whether their development has 
been legislative, through Rules, or judicial, through common law.
This article begins with preliminary consideration of the reasons for my proposals, 
including the dwindling number of jury trials.6  It then examines the hearsay rule, proceeds next 
to consider rules governing repetitive-behavior evidence, and also covers issues regarding 
opinion evidence, experts, and authentication.7 These issues involve most of the common 
exclusionary principles. The article then considers the rest of the 400 series—relevance related 
rules, particularly those in Rules 401 through 403—and proposes a modified formulation of 
them.8  Next, the article evaluates some overall issues that apply to all of these exclusionary 
rules, including their impact upon trials—a vanishing event, today—and including strategic 
responses by judges and litigants to their retrenchment. In this regard, the article considers 
separate rules that could be inaugurated if the existing rules were pruned as suggested, including 
rules designed to get lawyers and trials to the point earlier.9 A final section considers the author’s 
conclusions, which include the proposition that although the results of this proposal for selective 
abolition are unpredictable, the current system is sufficiently dysfunctional to make it 
worthwhile to try significant revisions in the rules of evidence.
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
A.  Why Such an Outlandish Proposal?
At the outset, let me say that I do not expect the idea of jettisoning major parts of the 
rules to achieve acceptance any time soon, or indeed ever. (I am not delusional, or at least not to 
6 See infra Pt. I of this article.
7 See infra Pts. II-V of this article.
8 See infra Pt. VI of this article.
9 See infra Pts. VII-VIII of this article.
4that point.) This article might be considered a thought exercise, although I hope it might do 
more: that it might serve the useful function of inducing debate about which parts of the rules 
that exclude good evidence really do not serve their purposes sufficiently to justify their 
retention. It might even lead to a kind of “zero based budgeting” by which the retention of rules 
that exclude significant amounts of useful evidence might be evaluated not merely by their 
having been in place for a long time,10 and not even by the possibility that they might in some 
cases be used to avoid decision by erroneous information,11 but by their achievement of positive 
purposes that perceptibly exceed their effect in making trials more expensive, unpredictable, 
inaccurate, and scarce.12
Above all, this article is a plea for evidence rule writers to focus upon the phenomenon of 
the vanishing trial when they tinker with the rules. I do not have statistical proof of the point, but 
I am convinced that, among some evidence scholars, there is a bias in favor of rules that exclude 
evidence and against rules that admit it. To elaborate, I believe that some evidence scholars, as 
rules drafters, would tend to accept the following ideas in evaluating new rule proposals:13
10
 For example, long existence explains the hearsay exception for excited utterances, although sound arguments 
show it to be unreliable.  See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
11
 For example, rules excluding evidence of repetitive conduct are explained, above all, by the “fear” that “a jury 
might overestimate the probative value of such evidence by assuming that merely because the defendant has 
committed crimes before, he is likely to be guilty of the offense charged.”  United States. v. Colvert, 523 F.2d 875 
(8th Cir. 1975).  This reasoning is singularly unpersuasive, because the “fear” that the jury might “overestimate” 
probative value supports the exclusion of almost any kind of evidence.  In fact, this “fear” should be lesser for 
repetitive evidence than for other kinds of evidence that are more direct, such as eyewitness identifications or DNA 
analyses.  See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
12 Cf. supra note 11.  The real problem with the exclusion of repetitive-conduct evidence is that justifications usually 
do not consider whether it provides useful evidence or whether the jury can reasonably evaluate it.  The Calvert 
justifications, for example, do not address these issues.
13 For examples of recent articles advocating restricted evidence admissibility, see, e.g., Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, 
Due Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487 (2005) 
(advocating significant restrictions of evidence admitted under Rules 413-14); Andrew Taslitz, What Remains of 
Reliability: Hearsay and Freestanding Due Process After Crawford v. Washington, 20 CRIM. JUSTICE 39 
(Summer 2005) (advocating restriction of currently admissible hearsay); Michael S. Vitale, Damaged Goods: Why, 
in Light of the Supreme Court’s Recent Punitive Damages Jurisprudence, Congress Must Amend the Federal Rules 
5(1) A rule that narrows the range of admissible evidence is more frequently a 
good idea than a rule that expands the available evidence;
(2) A rule that amends an existing provision about admissibility by adding 
requirements to the elements already present, in the manner of ornaments on 
a holiday tree, is more often a good idea than a rule that reduces 
requirements;
(3) A rule that makes predicate elements more difficult to prove is more often a 
good idea than one that makes predicates more readily demonstrable; and
(4) A rule that conditions evidence admissibility on a notice requirement is 
almost always a good idea.
I could go on in developing the specifics of what I see as an evidence-narrowing tendency among 
some evidence scholars, but I hope that the point is sufficiently clear. And I should add that my 
only systematic empirical support for inferring this tendency is furnished by recent rules 
amendments that scholars have successfully sponsored. Their thrust has been generally in the 
direction of narrowing the scope of admissible evidence.14 But also, to an extent, my assertion 
that these are the tendencies of many evidence scholars is based upon observations made during 
committee meetings and the like. What gets studied most thoroughly when evidence scholars 
look at the rules is the immediate issue in a particular rule, in isolation;15 what gets emphasized is 
of Evidence, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1405 (2005) (advocating restrictions of evidence of similar but extraterritorial 
events offered to prove punitive damages).
14 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 702 (amended to exclude all expert opinion unless it meets three new numbered 
requirements); Fed. R. Evid. 703 (amended to prohibit merits use of facts or data supporting expert opinion and to 
limit admissibility for other purposes); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (amended to exclude co-conspirators’ statements 
unless predicate is proved by extrinsic evidence).
   The most significant Rules that have expanded admissibility, Rules 413-15, did not originate with evidence 
scholars, but instead came from Congress; in fact, it was opposed, usually vehemently, by scholars.  See infra notes 
191-92 and accompanying text.  There also have been amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 804(6) (forfeiture by 
wrongdoing) and 803(6) (business record affidavits), but they affect few cases compared to the exclusionary 
amendments.
15 See Donald Nicolson, Truth, Reason, and Justice: Epistemology and Politics in Evidence Discourse, 57 Mod. L. 
Rev. 726, 741-2 (1994) (concluding that scholars spend their time studying admissibility, which is a small part of 
litigation, and that the Rules can be seen better in context).
6the concerns raised by the possibility of unreliable inferences;16 and what sometimes gets lost is 
the big picture: the cumulative effect of the rules in creating “gotcha”-type arguments,17 in 
reducing worthwhile information,18 and in making the trials of cases more complicated and 
difficult.19 In this article, I hope to make arguments in the opposite direction.
The ultimate effect of the article, I would hope, might be that individual rules would 
come to be written and interpreted only after consideration of their effects on the vanishing trial. 
For example, there have been arguments to the effect that the residual exception to the hearsay 
rule is too easily invoked and that the exception should be limited to highly unusual cases.20 I 
doubt the premise of the argument (my own guess is that the exception is too rarely invoked),21
but even if the premise were granted, I believe that there would be sound reasons for broad 
16
“Evidence is the limits placed on what the jury hears.”  Twining, William, Evidence As a Multi-Disciplinary 
Subject, 2 Law, Probability & Risk 91, 96 (2003) (http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/academics/profiles/twining/
evidence_multi.pdf.
17
 Notice requirements, for example, have proliferated.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 412, 413-15, 609, 807.  The 
policy is obvious and unobjectionable in every instance, but I believe the cumulative effect of these and the mass of 
other notice requirements is the disproportionate creation of “gotcha” arguments.  In other words, the rules create 
ambush situations in which the proponent is in good faith and has either not known of one among the many scattered 
requirements or has believed the other party already has notice, and in which the opponent seeks a windfall escape 
from the effect of otherwise admissible evidence on the basis of violations that create little prejudice.
18 See infra Pts. II-V of this article (discussing impact of rules excluding hearsay, repetitive conduct, expert opinion, 
and items not formally authenticated).
19 See infra Pts. IB-C, VIIB, D (discussing impact of rules on strategy, complexity, and trial frequency).
20 See Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catch-Alls on Criminal Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets the 
Hearsay Wolf and Is Devoured, 25 LOYOLA L. REV. 925 (1992); Myrna S. Raeder, A Response to Professor Swift: 
The Hearsay Rule at Work—Has It Been Abolished DeFacto by Judicial Discretion? 76 MINN. L. REV. 473, 507 
(1992).
21
 The argument is often based upon comparisons of results of criminal defendant’s appeals of residual exception 
rulings admitting prosecution evidence and excluding defense evidence.  See authorities cited in supra note 20.  
Although these data are easy to collect, I do not believe that they reflect the impact of the residual exception.  
Exclusions during trial of prosecution evidence almost never would produce appeals, and neither would a 
defendant’s successful invocation of the residual exception, so that the data are by definition likely to support the 
commentator’s arguments even if those arguments are flatly incorrect.  Furthermore, appeals of residual-exception 
rulings are exceedingly rare in comparison to other evidentiary or procedural issues, suggesting that they argument 
is overstated.  The “fallacy of availability” is a term used to describe inferences based on easily available data rather 
than those more determinative of the question.  See DAVID CRUMP, HOW TO REASON ABOUT THE LAW: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE FOUNDATIONS OF PUBIC POLICY 52-53 (2001).
    A better data set might be composed by surveying District Judges or Assistant United States Attorneys.  “In how 
many cases have you admitted/introduced evidence by using the ‘residual exception’ to the hearsay rule?”  The 
question probably would prompt many answers of, “I’ve never heard of it.”
7acceptance of the residual exception.22 As another example, initial proposals for the Federal 
Rules featured a far more flexible hearsay rule than the relatively rigid one we actually have. It 
contained a broad exception admitting hearsay that had measures of trustworthiness and 
necessity, for which the exceptions would have served as examples, rather than as rigid 
categories.23 The proposal was narrowed to produce the present rules because of traditional 
concerns about hearsay risks.24 As will appear further below, I argue that more general 
admittance of hearsay would be a good thing, and the initial proposal contained in the House Bill 
was consistent with my arguments. Similarly, my arguments would support both the current rules 
admitting repetitive conduct in sexual assault cases and the extension of the same principle to 
other cases, the liberalization of expert opinion evidence,25 and many other specific changes in 
the rules or their interpretation. 
In summary, I do not hope for wholesale acceptance of my proposal here. Instead, what I 
hope for is recognition of the cumulative tendency of the current rules to contribute to the 
expense, unpredictability, inaccuracy, and evanescence of trials, and for application of this 
recognition to any debate about individual rules. 
B.  The Problem of Presenting Live Witnesses (and the Insistence of the Rules upon It)
22 See infra Pt. IIA of this article (costs of hearsay exclusion).  Exclusion of evidence conforming to the residual 
exception is particularly costly because the rule requires it to be trustworthy and incapable of sound coverage by 
substitutes.
23
 See Testimony of Professor Paul F. Rothstein, Hearings on H.R. 5463 (Federal Rules of Evidence), Committee on 
the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 215, 266-67, 270-75 (June 4-5, 1974).  The proposal under 
consideration would have abolished categorical exceptions and substituted broad discretionary admissibility of 
hearsay that was trustworthy and needed.  This proposal would have achieved the substantial equivalent of the 
proposals for hearsay revision in this article.
24 See Id..; see also Fed. R. Evid. 801-07 (reflecting much narrower admissibility, with categorical exceptions).  
Professor Rothstein’s views were, as always, well reasoned and persuasive, and I am unusual in believing that they 
pointed in the wrong direction.
25 See infra Pts. II-V (continuing arguments for admissibility of these items).
8I come to this problem from a background in trials, both civil and criminal. Of all the 
ways in which the world of trial is different from ideal of the evidence-course classroom, perhaps 
there is none comparable to the issue of presenting live witnesses. In my evidence courses, a 
common question is, “Why didn’t the plaintiff just present the live witness?” The question comes 
from students who, like many of their professors, have never seen a jury trial, much less had the 
complex responsibility of putting one together.  The key point here is that the logistical problem 
of presenting the bodies of all of one’s witnesses in real time is a heavy burden in even a 
relatively short trial.  Von Klausewitz is famous for the elegant metaphor, “the fog of war” (or 
“friction” of war,” depending upon translation), in which machinery doesn’t work and no one is 
exactly where he or she is supposed to be;26 and the analogous metaphor, “the fog of trial,” 
equally fits a presentation before a jury, where a lone attorney functions without a military chain 
of command but faces a comparably daunting task.
Thus, the naïve question, “Why didn’t the plaintiff just present the live witness?,” implies 
that there is no cost or difficulty in doing so. Many of the rules are written from this perspective: 
that insistence upon currently-testifying, live witnesses will sacrifice nothing. That there will be 
no expense in bringing the witness to testify live, no likelihood of loss of the evidence, and no 
other disadvantages. The assumption is wildly at variance with reality.  As von Klausewitz put it, 
because of the “fog” or friction” of the endeavor, “The simplest thing is difficult.”27
These issues can be particularly acute for the appointed criminal defense lawyer.  This 
solitary combatant must, while multitasking, physically produce reluctant, frightened, or 
26 See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON 482-86 (describing von Klausewitz’s tactical principles, including  the 
“friction” of war, and the many ways in which these principles apply to analogous contests such as trials).  See also
TOM CLANCY (WITH GENERAL FRED FRANKS), INTO THE STORM 2-10 (1997) (describing Desert Storm 
invasion of Iraq; pointing out that the basic strategies explained by von Klausewitz are still dominant today).
27 See authorities cited in supra note 26.
9unresponsive witnesses to offer raw facts about alibi, self-defense, or lack of mens rea.  Often, 
the barriers are insurmountable.  Consider the following explanation by one defense lawyer:28
. . . And I’m bringing in witnesses to say, “No, he wasn’t there.”  And witnesses 
are a problem . . . . I have people I’d love to have come in, and they won’t come.  
I can’t force them.  In theory there is subpoena power, but in fact if somebody 
said, “I’m not going to come,” they’re not going to come.  A lot of these people 
are scared to death.
This excerpt describes war crimes defenses in an international tribunal, but make no mistake: 
analogous effects in this country can be greater rather than lesser.  The description above covers 
witnesses fearful of political reprisals from dismantled institutions, whereas witnesses in 
domestic criminal trials involving, say, organized crime, must reckon with more acute threats 
from ongoing disciplined enterprises.29
I tried criminal cases that had been set and reset more than a dozen times, with the 
witnesses summoned each time, because that was necessary.30  I tried civil cases that had been 
similarly reset multiple times.31 On occasion, a reasonable, intelligent witness came to decide 
that, after several reschedulings, enough was enough, and he or she would not appear another 
time.32 Usually, this decision included a perception that the American justice system was 
28
 21 Tex. Lawyer, Feb. 13, 2006, at 5, 7 (quoting remarks of criminal defense lawyer Tom Moran).
29
 “What if a criminal defendant deliberately kills all of the witnesses against him to prevent their testimony?  They 
may have made statements, . . . but these statements would be [excluded] by the hearsay rule.”  ROTHSTEIN, 
EVIDENCE 258.  See United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir. 1996) (addressing numerous issues arising 
from evidence admitted under similar circumstances).  Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) (forfeiture by wrongdoing) partially 
addresses this issue but provides no relief when witnesses simply absent themselves because they are fearful or 
distrustful of the criminal justice system—as frequently happens—or when the opponent’s conduct cannot be 
proved.
30 Cf., e.g., DAVID CRUMP & WILLIAM J. MERTENS, THE STORY OF A CRIMINAL CASE: THE STATE V. 
ALBERT DELMAN GREENE 72-73 (2d ed. 2001) (tracing history of robbery case reset for trial four times before 
actual trial) [hereinafter cited as CRUMP, CRIMINAL CASES].
31 Cf., e.g., CRUMP, CIVIL CASE 44-47 (tracing history of small-damages civil case reset for trial six times over 
eight months before actual trial).  See also Id. 48-49 (depicting one of many subpoenas that solo-practitioner 
plaintiff’s attorney had to have served for each of the repetitive resets of this case).
32 See, e.g., David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 34 & n. 165 (1997) (describing 
one such case).
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hopelessly ineffective, as well as a sensible assessment of the resulting incursions on the 
witness’s own essential affairs. I saw instances in which courts kept working people sitting on 
benches just outside courtrooms for weeks on end, losing significant amounts of their wages, just 
to be sure they would be present in case their testimony might be needed. Judges did this for a 
good reason: the insistence of the rules on live testimony and the unpredictability of contacting 
an “on call” witness with an expectation of immediate appearance.33 I saw witnesses produced at 
great expense to prove uncontested and tangential issues. I tried one case as an assistant district 
attorney that involved a complex theft from the telephone company and that required the 
assemblage of many witnesses from six different States. I had no hope that my county 
government could pay the bill to bring them all in; the expense was too great. Instead, the 
presentation of my case depended upon the telephone company’s willingness to fund the travel 
of all of these witnesses.  For an appointed defense attorney, this issue of interstate witnesses 
arises less frequently, but with more intense effects when it does arise.
Because of these kinds of considerations, when a lawyer prepares a trial notebook, the 
first page usually is a directory of witnesses: alternate telephone numbers, as many means of 
contact as possible, and notes about which live bodies are going to be difficult to produce, and 
why.34 The party with the burden of proof really sweats the issue of physically presenting that 
party’s witnesses.  So does the defense lawyer who prepares to present an alibi or self-defense 
33 Cf. Brooks v. Brooks, 561 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (denial of continuance affirmed where lawyer 
arranged to call his client by telephone for trial but was unable to do so because a defect, which client promptly 
reported and had repaired, prevented telephone from ringing). 
34 See WILLIAM V. DORSANEO, III, ET AL., TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRIAL AND APPELLATE
PRACTICE 25-32 (4th ed. 2001) (showing difficulty of obtaining continuance for want of testimony; stating that 
inability to produce clients (or witnesses, by implication) at trial “is more frequent than you might suppose” and that 
attorney “is well advised to obtain several places through which to get in touch with” these persons).  Cf. Charles W. 
Schwartz, Trial Preparation, Part 1: Getting Discovery, Evidence, Pleadings, Motions, and Orders in Trial Ready 
Form, in UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW FOUNDATION, THE JURY TRIAL 15-1 (2005) (placing issue of 
securing witness attendance at first page of Continuing Legal Education presentation on Trial Preparation).
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claim.35 A plaintiff in a middling sized personal injury case treats this as a major problem, and 
foresight may prompt the plaintiff’s attorney to decline an otherwise viable case.36 It should be 
obvious that for either an individual or for a business entity, the result is an enormous 
multiplication of the expense of litigation—an increase in cost that can make trial impractical 
even to preserve a thoroughly justified position.37
For some witnesses, the issue is deeper. Many witnesses find their contacts with the 
justice system destructive, to say the least. Some would rather go through virtually any other 
kind of unpleasant experience short of open heart surgery. The incidentally involved witness who 
is kept on the stand to be cross examined for more than a week is an example.38 That experience 
is not merely time consuming; the attack is demeaning and debilitating, even though it is 
encouraged systematically by our evidentiary customs, since cross examiners are motivated to 
exhaust witnesses to precipitate mistakes.39 The crime victim who is similarly treated is a more 
35 Cf. CRUMP, CRIMINAL CASE 97-101 (showing defense attorney’s presentation of four witnesses to support 
alibi, but including only close relatives or friends who could be expected to appear without subpoena; also showing, 
however, that in spite of reliance on institutional documents, defense attorney presented no witnesses from those 
institutions).
36 Cf. CRUMP, CIVIL CASE 126 (reproducing plaintiff’s attorney’s explanation that he was unable to obtain 
substantial damages in slip-and-fall case because he did not produce plaintiff’s physician, a tactic made necessary 
because the suit was “kind of a marginal case” and “I would have had to pay the doctor myself for his time”; adding 
that “if the case were taken by a [personal injury] specialist, he’d have paid to have the doctor there, but then again, 
he wouldn’t have taken the case in the first place”).  
37 See generally Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1996) (analyzing vanishing number of trials, including cases in which both parties lose because 
prevailing party expends more in trial expense than difference between other side’s settlement offer and verdict) 
[hereinafter cited as Gross & Syverud].
38 See David Crump, supra note 32, at 37-39 (describing the cross examination of a witness named Dennis Fung, 
which lasted nearly two weeks, with questions reported as “so detailed and repetitive” that he was left tired and 
confused, or “weary and glum”; providing other examples; analyzing the strategy that produces this result and 
examining its purposes).
39 Id. at 32-39 (describing the “witness control or debilitation function” of cross examination, involving techniques 
enabling the examiner to “extend the examination to any desired length,” so that the witness becomes “sufficiently 
tired, frustrated, or confused”; providing examples).
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compelling case, and the child who testifies against her abuser is a more compelling example 
still.40
None of these issues excuses compliance with the rules. In particular, none can avoid the 
effect in criminal cases of the Confrontation Clause, which requires the live presence of some 
kinds of witnesses.41 My mention of the anecdotal information above is not intended to argue to
the contrary. Instead, I wish only to establish the point that our heavy insistence on live 
testimony is not, in fact, cost-free, although that point may not be always or even frequently 
considered. Furthermore, there are issues of policy underlying evidence rules or their 
interpretation that do not depend upon nonnegotiable requirements such as the Confrontation 
Clause, and I would argue for the consideration of the difficulty and expense of producing live 
testimony as one factor to be considered in deciding such an issue.42 Throughout this article, I 
shall provide examples of what I am talking about.
For the moment, one good example of my point is furnished by the Federal Rules 
governing use of depositions at trial. The Federal Rules require live testimony rather than 
depositions in almost all cases, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions.43 Imagine a plaintiff 
who has difficulty producing a particular live witness and who wishes to rely instead upon a 
deposition of the witness. The plaintiff can argue,44
40 See Id. at 34 (describing the effects).  See generally David Crump, Child Victim Testimony, Psychological 
Trauma, and the Confrontation Clause: What Can the Scientific Literature Tell Us?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMM. 83 (1992) (analyzing literature; concluding that surprisingly little is predictable; explaining why a judge’s 
determination that a particular child is “tough” and “impervious to harm” may be seriously in error because 
precisely such children may be “especially vulnerable to harm”).
41 See infra Pt. IID of this article.
42
 In addition to the example give here, see Pt. VIB of this article (describing potentially huge but hidden expense 
imposed by unavailability conditions upon hearsay exceptions in Rule 804).
43
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 32.  Although it appears in the procedural rules, this Rule is really an evidence rule, describing 
what is in effect an unavailability exception to the hearsay rule for depositions, but one conditioned upon narrow 
requirements.
44 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (prescribing requirements for depositions).
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The witness was under oath, as a deposition requires. The witness was subject to 
cross examination, as a deposition requires, and was, in fact, thoroughly cross 
examined. There was eye-to-eye confrontation, because the defendant was present 
across the table, as opposing parties often are at a deposition. And finally, 
although demeanor is a poor method of evaluating truthfulness, this deposition 
was videotaped, and the jury can fully evaluate the witness’s demeanor.
In other words, the plaintiff can argue that all of the traditional protections thought to be 
safeguarded by live testimony are present.45 The deposition cannot, however, be properly used 
under the Federal Rules under these conditions. Many States have changed this rule, to allow 
free use of depositions46 or to provide that depositions are usable unless the opponent produces 
the witness.47 The Supreme Court and Congress really should change the Federal Rule, too. But 
because rule drafters seldom evaluate the erroneous but facile assumption of easy presentation of 
live witnesses, the Federal Rule disallows most uses of depositions.
The decision of the First Circuit in Frechette v. Welch48 illustrates the dismal results that 
this Federal Rule about depositions sometimes produces. The witness at issue was a diagnosing 
physician. The proponent offered the physician’s testimony through a videotaped deposition. The 
proponent pointed out that the parties had stipulated that the deposition could be used for all 
purposes allowed under the laws of New Hampshire, the forum State, which permitted 
depositions under the circumstances.49 In addition, the proponent offered evidence of an 
exception to the Federal Rule, in the form of a letter from the witness’s own physician to the 
45 See infra Pt. IIB of this article (describing alleged hearsay risks and protections against them).
46 See DORSANEO et al, supra note 34, at 240 (describing free use of depositions under Texas Rules of Civil 
Procedure, irrespective of availability).
47 Cf. infra notes 48-49 (describing New Hampshire rules).
48
 621 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1980).
49 Id. at 13.
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effect that the witness had suffered a recent heart attack, and argued that this fact made the 
witness unavailable.50
The trial court admitted the evidence before the jury, but the First Circuit held that this 
receipt of the deposition was error.51 The Federal Rule controlled, it said, not the parties’ 
stipulation. The letter showed only a heart attack, and it did not contain the further statement that 
the witness was truly unable to appear due to illness.52 Furthermore, the letter was hearsay, and it 
should not have been considered at all for purposes of determining unavailability.53 This last 
conclusion was especially dubious: issues concerning the effects of evidence rules do not 
normally require information conforming to the rules of evidence themselves,54 and the court’s 
reasoning was tantamount to a requirement that live evidence must be produced to prove the 
unavailability of live evidence. The Federal Rule, therefore, required that the proponent produce 
the witness live rather than using his deposition. That was the Court of Appeals’ holding, 
meaning that the use of the deposition was error. Then, however, the court concluded, against all 
reason, that the error was harmless,55 even though it provided direct expert evidence governing 
the central issue in the case. This transparent judicial fudging produced a sound outcome, even 
though it made sense only in light of a dysfunctional rule that the court perhaps realized it had 
interpreted poorly. 
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54
 Specifically, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to the determination of facts that govern evidentiary 
predicates.  See, Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(1) (providing that the rules “do not apply to” the “determination of questions 
of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence. . . .”  Strictly speaking, this Rule may not govern an issue covered 
by the (separate) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but it is anomalous to admit evidence subject to loosely proved 
predicates specified by hearsay exceptions containing none of the protections against recognized hearsay risks, while 
setting stringent and nearly unattainable requirements of proof of predicates for depositions, which usually reflect all 
of these protections.  See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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The arguments that I shall make in this article support the revision of the Federal Rule 
governing depositions, and they support a different interpretation of that Rule than the First 
Circuit’s reading. My larger thesis, however, is that many exclusionary principles in the rules of 
evidence are so dysfunctional in general that they should be pruned severely . Still, it is not 
necessary for the reader to agree with me on that broad front for the point to be useful. There are 
many instances in which my arguments would support modest revisions of individual rules, 
revisions that might appeal to some readers. The difficulty for the evidence proponent posed by a 
rigid insistence upon live witnesses is one perspective, for me, that drives these arguments.
C.  The Complexity Effect in Decisionmaking under Formal Rules
The conclusions of this article also are driven by a concern for the right amount of 
formalism in rules, including rules of evidence. What do I mean by “the right amount of 
formalism?” All that I am trying to engender is an appreciation of the possibility that the 
complexity of formal rules is a “Goldilocks problem.” When Goldilocks tried the first bowl of 
porridge, it was too hot; the second was too cold; the third was just right. Similarly, some kinds 
of problems require solutions that avoid both not enough, at one end, and too much at the other.56
There is a level that is just right, and more is not better, even though less or none at all may not 
be better either. Accordingly, the introduction of formal rules can enhance satisfactory 
decisionmaking. The concept that a decisionmaker should follow a prescribed set of steps is 
thought to provide better results not only in the law, but in other fields as well.57 What gets lost, 
however, particularly in rulemaking, is the concern at the opposite end: the possibility that, if the 
56
 An analogous “right level” problem concerns the very different issue of punitive damages.  Too much produces 
overkill, which causes producers of products and services to expend safety resources wastefully, whereas too little 
produces inadequate safety.  See David Crump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics:  What Information Should Jurors 
Be Given to Determine the Amount of a Punitive-Damage Award?, 57 MD. L. REV. 174, 190-201 (1998) 
(developing this point by economic analysis).
57 See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON 182-85 (describing due diligence in business decisionmaking, consisting of 
prescribed formal steps).
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prescribed set of steps is too expensive, abstract, or divorced from direct concerns—if it is too 
formal, in other words—it may begin to interfere with satisfactory decisionmaking.
The simplified figure that accompanies these words attempts to put this idea into a chart 
or graph.58 The horizontal axis is the complexity of formal decisionmaking, and the vertical axis 
is the degree to which the resulting decisionmaking is satisfactory. Obviously, neither of these 
qualities is precisely measurable, and in fact neither is easy to define. The graph should be 
considered loosely, in the same way as illustrative depictions of social cost curves by 
economists:59 as an aid to visualizing a theoretical relationship, rather than as a mathematical 
construct. At the left side of the curve, there are few formal procedures. A factory or firm makes 
a major decision, such as hiring a division head, without a checklist requiring it to generate 
candidates, interview them, check references, or the like; or, a monarch settles a dispute between 
two citizens with no rules of evidence or of substance, in the manner of King Solomon.60 The 
58
 It is believed that this simple Figure is unique with the author.
59 See David Crump, supra note 56, at 191-94 (providing examples of cost curves).
60 See 1 Kings 3:16-28 (King James version).  The Bible reports that the monarch used the psychological trick of 
suggesting that a baby be cut in half to dispose of a maternity dispute, then awarded the baby to the contestant who 
was willing to surrender her son rather than see him killed.  King Solomon apparently arrived at this procedure 
idiosyncratically, without any formal rules.
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result may be a poor decision, one influenced by biases such as availability or anchoring. The 
addition of a few formal processes increases the quality of the decision, on average. More 
formalism may increase it further. A point is reached eventually, however, at which the relative 
complexity of formal constraints seems likely to produce the most enhanced decision, all factors 
considered. Beyond that point, increases in formal constraints have a negative effect.  They serve 
to cramp decisionmaking rather than enhance it. At some point, in other words, more formality
serves only to produce a worse decision.61
Again, it should be emphasized that this visualization tool is imprecise and theoretical. In 
a way, it depicts the clash of two jurisprudential philosophies, those of the legal realists and the 
process school. Justice Holmes, who was nothing if not a realist, argued that the “felt necessities 
of the times,” or judges’ discretionary decisions about what would be best, was a greater 
influence on legal decisionmaking than formal logic.62 The process school, on the other hand, 
reacted to the perceived excesses of this viewpoint because it implied no limits upon a judge’s 
ability to inflict idiosyncratic or even malevolent preferences upon the citizenry. As a corrective, 
the process school called for formal procedures that would remain consistent from decision to 
decision.63 The right balance between these two philosophies, which arguably are aimed at 
different concerns although both have appeal, is the issue that I am raising here.
When it comes to evidence rules, formal processes are appropriate, but I would argue that 
we sometimes neglect the upper end of the Goldilocks problem, the issue of excessive 
61
 Thus, this article contains examples of formal processes so costly or complex that they threatened to confuse or 
distort the decision.  See, e.g., supra notes 29, 32, 35, 36 and accompanying text.
62 See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON 325-30 (describing the legal realists).  The culmination of this kind of 
reasoning was pervasive indeterminancy, such as the “ethical relativism” of Edward Westermarck, who argued that 
moral judgments could not be said to “possess objective validity,” that nothing was provably “good or bad, right or 
wrong,” and that moral principles could not “express anything more than the opinions of those who believe in 
them.”  Id. at 234-36.
63 Id. at 236.
18
formalism. A rule that has three formal elements can always be rewritten to incorporate four, or 
five, or six. The additional elements may be aimed at sound policy justifications, in fact. But 
when we increase the number of formal elements, we increase the cost and difficulty of 
compliance, and we may introduce distracting factual arguments, create legal ambiguities, and 
produce less satisfactory decisions. I would say that we have reached this point with some 
hearsay principles, such as the unavailability definition,64 and with the long list of requirements 
for expert opinion evidence (some with multiple sub-requirements).65 When there are as many as 
eight separate requirements66 for the introduction of a particular kind of information before the 
jury, the vagueness of the criteria and the proliferation of factual issues guarantees that the 
determination will be exceedingly costly, and unless the standards are written with extraordinary 
skill, the opponent will find a promising point of attack even when policy would expeditiously 
admit the evidence. It might be better to guide the judge by a single standard, or two, or three, 
rather than eight or more. This idea, that the advantages of formal processes reach a limit with 
increasing complexity, is another of the concerns that drives this article. Throughout it, I shall 
point out examples of rules or groups of rules that I think defeat their purposes because of an 
excess of formal complexity. 
D. Will Elimination of Exclusionary Rules Really Increase the Frequency of Jury Trials, and 
Would This Really Be a Good Thing?
(1) The Effects of Evidentiary Rules on the Vanishing Trial
No one can know with certainty whether the proposals I have made here will truly 
increase trials. Since these approaches have not been tested, there is no statistical means of 
64 See infra Pt. VIIB of this article (analyzing cost effects of these requirements).
65 See infra Pt. IV of this article (analyzing cost, complexity, and error-inducing aspects of law governing expert 
testimony).
66 See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text for an example.
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proving or disproving the point. I believe, however, that they will. Here are some of the reasons 
for this belief.
First, rulings on evidence consume a large portion of the time spent in a jury trial, and 
these proposals probably would reduce that time, although they would not eliminate it. As a 
means of testing this hypothesis, I considered the record in one simple jury trial, a slip-and-fall 
case, a case lasting about two days.67 By my estimate, evidentiary objections, arguments, 
compliance mechanisms, and rulings occupied about one-third of the duration of this particular 
trial, or in other words, they increased the length of trial by about fifty percent. In coming to this 
conclusion, I included the time spent hearing motions and evidentiary issues related to 
evidentiary rulings that occurred on the eve of trial.68 In summary, eliminating this time spent on 
evidentiary issues would, by itself, free up an estimated 33 percent of the time now spent in 
trial69 and would enable us to increase the percentage of trials by an analogous percentage, 
without any additional resources. The proposals offered here would not eliminate all of the time 
spent in this manner, because my suggestion is for retention of some exclusionary principles, 
particularly Rules 401 through 403 in a modified form,70 but they would substantially decrease 
other evidentiary issues concerning hearsay, expert opinion, repetitive conduct, and 
authentication.
67 See generally CRUMP, CIVIL CASE (reproducing proceedings in a slip-and-fall case).
68 See, Id. 47-48, 50-51 (motion in limine requiring hearing; immediate pretrial hearing considering complex issues 
surrounding whether medical records, as hearsay, fit business records exception).
69
 Generalizing this finding from a single case is, of course, debatable.  One can argue, however, that complex cases 
can be expected to create more evidentiary issues for the time they consume than this single slip-and-fall case did.  
At the extreme, capital murder trials frequently last several months, during which defense counsel will have the 
understandable motive to raise and argue every conceivable evidentiary point.  See DAVID CRUMP AND 
GEORGE O. JACOBS, A CAPITAL CASE IN AMERICA 29-73 (2000) (describing pretrial and trial proceedings 
in a capital case).
70 See infra Pt. VI of this article.
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Second, the current rules mean that the evidence appears in a disorganized order. The 
sequence of witnesses often is dictated by availability rather than by the logic of presentation.71
This disorganization requires drawing and redrawing of the relationship among evidentiary 
points. When a second witness is called after a first witness whose testimony is relevant only 
because of the second witness, attorneys must spend large amounts of time reorienting the jury 
so that the connection is clear. The time spent in this manner should not be minimized; advice to 
lawyers about how to conduct a direct examination stresses this idea of redrawing the picture or 
reorienting the jury.72 The proposals at issue here would decrease this effect by allowing greater 
use of pretrial testimony such as depositions and greater use of repeated statements of witnesses,
and these proposals would shorten trials for this reason.73
Third, the revision suggested later in this article, in Rules 401 and 402, would empower 
and encourage the judge to eliminate evidence of very slight relevance—relevance so slight that 
it cannot be expected to influence a reasonable juror.74 One might think that the Rules already do 
this. But actually, they do not. Some judges accomplish the purpose by interpretation of Rules 
401 through 403 that eliminates long-string evidence, and some find other devices, such as rules 
limiting cross to the scope of the direct, to accomplish the same thing even more artificially; but 
other judges permit the development of evidence with only the slightest connection to anything 
in the case.75 The Rules are not written, now, in a manner that expressly requires the judge to 
consider this issue. The materials below in part VI of this article will explain why, in greater 
71 See infra Pt. IB of this article.
72 Cf. David Crump & Joe W. Redden, Testimony from Your Own Witnesses: Direct Examination Strategies, in 
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON, THE JURY TRIAL Pt. 8, at 4, 5, 6 (2005) (Continuing Legal Education materials 
emphasizing need for frequent reorientation of jury during evidence presentation).
73 See supra Pt. IB of this article.
74 See supra Pt. VI of this article.
75 Id.
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depth. At the same time, attorneys have strong incentives for the use of marginally relevant 
evidence, often for the very purpose of lengthening examinations.76 The proposals contained here 
would reduce this effect by giving the judge a mandatory rule requiring the elimination of 
evidence too attenuated to make a difference.
Finally, the rules at issue here would allow for the enforcement of relatively strict limits 
on the time consumed by single-witness examinations or by each side’s cumulative presentations 
in a jury trial.  These kinds of limits are difficult to impose or enforce under our current regime.  
But simplification of the form in which the evidence is received, better organization of witnesses, 
and elimination of highly marginal evidence, as proposed here, would allow us to adopt rules 
such as those proposed in a later section of this article, at Part VIII, requiring the judge to impose 
time limits in advance—generous and flexible, to be sure, but almost certainly effective to reduce 
waste of time, nevertheless.
(2) Would an Increase in Percentages of Trials (without New Resources) Be 
a Good or a Bad Thing?
Then, there is the separate question: would an increase in the frequency of jury trials be a 
good thing? I believe it would, again for several reasons. First, the decrease in trials results, in 
large measure, from an increased use of judge-imposed dispositions on points of law.77 There is 
no clear way of knowing, but I doubt that there has been an increase in percentages of cases 
worthy of this disposition comparable to the number of cases thus eliminated. In other words, 
many of the cases may reflect judicial fudging in which judges stretch to force cases into 
categories capable of disposition on pure points of law. Summary judgment by evidence 
elimination or by inferences properly left to juries, disposition by sanctions, and deadline 
76 Id.
77 See supra Pt. IC of this article; infra Pt. VIIB of this article.
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enforcement seem especially suspect in this regard. This article will return to this point in Part
VII, below. 
Second, other dispositions are made up of settlements. It is a good thing that a very high 
percentage of our cases result in settlement, because we cannot afford the resources to handle 
every dispute by a full-blown jury trial. But when trials are reduced to a vanishing level, one 
begins to suspect that there are settlements that would not be reached if trials were more readily 
available. In fact, the prospect of the vanishing trial means that judges will manage cases with 
heavy-handed encouragement of settlement firmly in mind, because they simply must do so—or 
they will have so many cases over which to preside that they cannot do justice to any of them.78
And so, as is developed in greater depth in Part VII below, the judge must adopt strategies for 
precipitating settlement. One of the simplest judicial strategies is to make rulings that escalate 
costs and risks for the party who, in the judge’s opinion, is most likely to be preventing 
settlement by recalcitrance.79 The trial statistics suggest strongly that this party is likely to be one 
that is firmly convinced of the rightness of his, her, or its position, and thus the settled cases may 
reflect many in which the judge is forcing settlement upon a party that has strong faith in the 
justice of the cause. This party, then, accepts a far lesser sum, or pays a far greater sum, than is 
believed to be owed.80
Third and finally, the rules probably result in the settlement of cases that would better be 
tried. What is meant, here, by “cases that would better be tried”? I believe that the rules 
discourage trials of some cases in which factual issues are closely contested, and that they 
increase the percentage of cases in which trials occur simply because the rules create opportunity 
78 See generally DAVID CRUMP et al., supra note 2, at 467-85 (discussing judicial case management).
79 See infra Pt. VIIB of this article.
80 See generally Gross & Syverud (concluding that there usually is a clear winner and a clear loser at trial).
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for arguments about exclusion of relevant, reliable, important evidence, of a kind that would 
result in rational settlements if the rules made admissibility clearer. In other words, the rules 
distort the playing field, and they distort settlement distribution, by excluding powerful and 
relevant evidence from some cases or by creating the prospect that evidence admissibility can be 
tested only by actually going to trial.81 This means that trials of cases in which there should be 
genuine dispute about the facts will be elbowed out by cases that would result in settlement if 
evidentiary rules were not so rigidly exclusionary: if they did not distort the outcomes by the 
reality (or the risk, which amounts to the same thing) that information useful to a rational 
decisionmaker will be suppressed. Again, this Article will re-evaluate these issues in Part VII, 
after putting forward more specific arguments about the exclusionary rules.
Unfortunately, I do not think that rule drafters consider these issues very seriously when 
they propose amendments. The immediate effect of a single rule becomes dominant in the debate 
over amendments, with consideration usually focused on the question whether the rule, in its 
existing form, might admit some evidence that could be unreliable. The question of costs and 
benefits, or the cumulative effect of the various exclusions, gets lost, and the achievement of 
artificial policies expressed in the existing rules becomes of overriding importance.82 The 
question whether the cumulative effect is to decrease the percentage of trials, or whether that 
effect is a bad thing, seldom merits much discussion. The arguments I have made in this section 
are difficult to prove or disprove, but the real point is that we have constructed a set of evidence 
rules that have serious influence on the underlying questions about ultimate effects on trials or 
outcomes—and we have done so without trying to answer those questions. 
81 See infra Pt. VIIb of this article.
82 See supra Pt. IA of this article.
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II. THE HEARSAY RULE AS A HISTORICAL 
ACCIDENT: HAVE WE PUSHED IT BEYOND ITS 
LOGIC?
The hearsay rule is probably the most extensive of our exclusionary principles.83  It 
provides that a statement uttered other than as current testimony is excluded if it is offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.84 The effect of the rule is to eliminate the use of a 
nontestifying declarant as a historical narrator.  It means, in the plain- English formulation that I 
use in introducing neophytes to the subject, that “you can’t testify about someone else’s version 
of the facts in court.”
The rule originated in response to historical events in England that have little to do with 
practice today: abuses in the Court of Star Chamber, for example, when trial was done by 
affidavit insulated deliberately from cross examination, with witnesses held incommunicado and 
tortured or threatened with torture, and with investigation of the accuracy of the resulting 
narratives severely restricted.85 A significant inciting event was the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for 
what was charged as a conspiracy against the King, in which the evidence included hearsay from 
an alleged coconspirator, Lord Cobham, who had retracted his declaration, as well as a narrative 
quoted from a declarant in another country.86 Sir Walter’s objection was not directed solely at the 
hearsay nature of the narrative as such, but also at its flimsiness to support conviction for crime: 
“This is the saying of some wild Jesuit or beggarly priest; but what proof is it against me?”87 The 
83
 Its coverage consumes more than one fourth of JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, EVIDENCE: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (10th ed. 2004), and a comparable amount of PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, EVIDENCE: CASES, 
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1998), both exclusive of appendices.
84
 Fed. R. Evid. 801(C) (definition), 802 (exclusion).
85 See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 338 (1883; 
reprinted 1976).
86 See JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, supra note 83, at 97-98.
87 Id. at 98.  For an earlier source, see J. G. PHILLIMORE, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE 157 (1850).
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later reaction to these abuses assured that the hearsay rule would come to be entrenched in 
English, and therefore in American, jurisprudence.88
But the costs of the hearsay rule have been too infrequently considered. These costs are 
many, and they are large.
A. The Costs of a General Rule against Hearsay
The hearsay rule now applies in American courts from top to bottom, with episodic 
exceptions for very small claims in some jurisdictions.89 If a citizen sues a sloppy business for 
taking the citizen’s money without performing properly, the hearsay rule will limit the evidence 
available to the citizen to prove the case.  For example, a written estimate of repair costs will 
likely be inadmissible.  Likewise, if an injured person sues another whose negligence is alleged 
to have caused the injury, the hearsay rule limits the evidence.90 A criminal defendant who seeks 
to offer evidence of the commission of the crime by another will see the best available evidence 
excluded— the ostensibly credible confession of the alleged other perpetrator—with the court 
remarking, perhaps, that “the holding may seem absurd to a layman.”91 The result is the removal 
of good evidence from the process, the lengthening of trials, and the confusion of narratives. 
Consider a simple case as an example. Leake v. Hagert92 appears in at least one evidence 
casebook—that of Professor Paul F. Rothstein et al.—where it is used to demonstrate both the 
88 See JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, supra note 83, at 97.
89 Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(b) (declaring applicability “generally to civil actions and proceedings” and “criminal cases 
and proceedings,” subject to expressed exceptions).
90 E.g., Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres, Inc., 16 Wis.2d 241, 114 N.W.2d 466 (1962) (excluding statement by usher at 
theatre relevant to cause of plaintiff’s slip and fall).  This result probably would change under Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(1)(D).
91 E.g., State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 195 S.E. 318 (N.C. 1931).  The result would remain the same under the 
Federal Rules, even though Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), unless there is corroboration strong enough to “clearly indicate” 
the trustworthiness of the confession.
92
 175 N.W.2d 675 (N.D. 1970).
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workings of the hearsay rule and the loss of good evidence that the rule creates.93 The case was a 
fender-bender, in which Leake claimed that Hagert had negligently driven her automobile into 
the back of a plow that Leake was towing on the highway, and in which Hagert counterclaimed 
for her own damages, alleging that Leake had been negligent in operating his vehicle “on a 
public highway after sunset, without proper lights, reflectors, or other warnings.”94 The 
contested evidence was the testimony of an insurance investigator, who repeated a statement 
from Leake’s son, who was said to have stated that the “red lens” on the “small rear light on the 
tractor” driven by Leake had been “out for some time.”95 The trial court evidently considered 
this statement good evidence, because it admitted it.  The state supreme court, however, applied 
the hearsay rule (correctly, according to its terms) and found reversible error. “The hearsay rule 
prohibits the use of a person’s assertion as equivalent to testimony of the fact asserted,” wrote 
the court.96 It added, “Leake’s son did not testify in the present action; he was not a party to the 
action; . . . and he was not available as a witness because he was overseas.”97 For all that appears 
in the opinion, it would have cost many times the amount in controversy, and many times her 
damages, for Hagert to have brought her opponent’s son home from “overseas” for a visit, but if 
Hagert wanted the evidence, this kind of wasteful expenditure was what was called for.
Imagine that Hagert had been involved in another type of activity, such as purchasing a 
residence, buying a business, hiring an employee, or deciding which university to attend. The 
amount at stake might be much greater than the dollars in controversy in her fender-bender. And 
93
 PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RAEDER, & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 73-74 (2d ed. 1998).
94 175 N.W.2d at 680.
95 Id. at 683.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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yet no one would attempt to settle these kinds of major controversies without reliance on 
hearsay. In fact, most of what the parties would rely upon in Hagert’s hypothetical home 
purchase would be hearsay, in the form of engineering reports, title reports, inspection reports, 
appraisals, and literally dozens of other items of unvarnished hearsay.98 Sensibly, we rely 
routinely upon these kinds of hearsay in bigger matters. But not in litigation; not even in small 
litigation such as Leake v. Hagert, and not even if the costs of exclusion transparently exceed the 
benefits.
The hearsay rule excludes good evidence. It did so in Leake v. Hagert. The declarant was, 
after all, the son of the party against whom it was offered. The statement used clear language that 
was not likely to be the subject of misunderstanding. It carried little risk of mistaken 
perception.99 Furthermore, the hearsay rule results in inability to prove facts that are subject to 
investigation and clear determination. In an equivalent situation involving the purchase of a 
residence, for example, hearsay results of investigations would be freely relied upon to resolve 
conflicts between the interests of the two parties.100 Even when nonhearsay evidence can be 
supplied, the draconian insistence of our legal system on the physical presence of each witness 
vastly increases the cost of trial, especially in small cases like Leake v. Hagert. The rule against 
hearsay is not applied to any other kind of important decision—only to litigation of the 
traditional, court-oriented variety. In fact, most alternate methods of dispute resolution, including 
98 See generally DAVID CRUMP & JEROME J. CURTIS, THE ANATOMY OF A REAL PROPERTY 
TRANSACTION (1984) (reproducing major documents and events during typical residential purchase and sale).
99
 For these reasons, the recognized hearsay risks were minimized and the protections against them diminished in 
importance.  See infra Pt. IIB of this article.
100
 For example, written reports of inspectors would enable the parties to determine whether defects would exceed 
the repair allowance expressed in their contract.  See DAVID CRUMP et al., supra note 98 at 8, 25 (reproducing 
excerpts from repair allowance in typical contract and engineering report based on inspection).
28
arbitration, feature agreements that contract out of the Rules of Evidence.101 In other words, 
parties who use common devices today to control their own processes virtually uniformly agree 
to abolish these complex rules that our system has contrived to exclude evidence. Even when 
proof is available in traditional litigation, the law’s insistence upon blanket exclusion of hearsay 
means that evidence is presented disjointedly and wastefully. The hearsay rule is of hideous 
difficulty for ordinary lawyers to apply,102 and when it is misapplied to receive evidence, as it 
was in the trial of Leake v. Hagert, or when it results in the erroneous exclusion of evidence, as it 
also does,103 it leads to results at variance with the merits or to expensive relitigation.
These disadvantages would be more readily tolerable if they were offset by resulting 
gains.  But the hearsay rule is not uniformly needed to achieve the benefits it is asserted to have.  
This article will turn next to that issue.
B. The Purposes Assertedly Served by the Hearsay Rule
Hearsay is said to involve a number of risks. Among these are perceptivity, qualification,
sincerity, expression, and bias.104 Perceptivity refers to the opportunity for observation of the 
phenomenon by the witness. For example, Leake’s son might not have seen the lens on the small 
red light when the tractor was operating, or he might have seen it only from such a distance that 
its operation was not ambiguously known to him. Qualification refers to the ability of the witness 
to process, retain, and report what he allegedly observed. The son might have been functionally 
blind or so ignorant of the operation of lights on vehicles that his report was unreliable. Next, 
101 See DAVID CRUMP et al., supra note 2, at 775.
102
 The concept of a statement not offered “for the truth of the matter stated” is such that attorneys and students often 
confuse it.  Casebooks usually contain repeated examples for students.  See authorities cited supra note 83.  This is 
only one aspect of the definition of hearsay that causes confusion; there are others.
103 E.g., Contractor Utility Sales Co., Inc. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 683 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1981).
104
 For slightly different formulations of these risks that overlap this description, see Lawrence Tribe, Triangulating 
Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-61 (1974); JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, supra note 83, at 105.
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sincerity means the tendency of the witness to avoid deliberate falsehood. It is possible that the 
son told the insurance adjuster that the light was “out” when he knew that in fact it was in perfect 
working order. Then, expression refers to the semiotics of the situation: the meaning, to both the 
son and the jurors who would listen to his reported remark, of the symbols contained in the 
reference to a “small light” and a “lens” that had been “out for some time.” When the son used 
the words, “out for some time,” he may not have meant the same thing that most of us would 
understand his remark to mean; he might have meant, for example, that the light blinked or 
buzzed, not that it did not operate, or that it was not covered by a red lens, or that it was only 
partially red-covered. “Bias,” of course, refers to cognitive blockages of truth in even sincere 
witnesses. The son might have hated his father to such an extent that, even while attempting to 
tell the truth, he attributed carelessness about the light to his father that did not exist.
These risks do not sound very persuasive in the context of Leake v. Hagert. Furthermore, 
they are not risks that require sophistication to evaluate.105 Jurors are not incapable of inferring 
and considering them. In fact, these risks are present whenever live witnesses testify, and they 
never can be quantified or eliminated no matter how many procedures, of however much 
complexity, we happen to put in place.106  Nevertheless, in response to the hearsay risks, the 
legal system poses a number of processes that are designed to control them. In fact, 
psychological studies strongly indicate that observers do no better than pure chance in evaluating 
live witnesses,107 and some studies suggest that they do better, actually, when unable to see the 
105
 Evaluating these risks is simple compared to, say, judging the credibility of admissible statistical, scientific, or 
engineering testimony from dueling expert witnesses.  See infra Pt. IV of this article.
106 Cf., e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (analysis of risks inherent in eyewitness 
testimony, when presented live, by both majority and dissent).
107 See Olin Guy Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1078-88 (1991) (discussing studies).
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speaker;108 these considerations forcefully undermine some of the arguments for excluding 
hearsay. In any event, the four processes that most often are mentioned are demeanor, eye-to-eye 
confrontation, the oath, and cross-examination.109 As we shall see, these processes are not the 
only ways to enable the jury to exercise the judgment that will reduce hearsay risks, and several 
of them are of doubtful efficacy.
Demeanor refers to the physical appearance of the witness while testifying, which the 
jury can observe as a purported aid to the detection of falsehood. Did the witness wipe his hands? 
Hesitate? Look down at the floor? Do these behaviors indicate probable falsehood, uncertainty, 
or bias? Actually, no.  They do not.  The psychological experiments thoroughly debunk the 
theory that these behaviors are sound inputs for detection of falsehood.110 In fact, the psychology 
of demeanor tends to support the concept that people are better judges of truth if they cannot 
observe the speaker.111 It seems that people are about as good (or bad) at appearing to tell the 
truth when they are not, or at accidentally creating the appearance of falsehood when testifying 
truthfully, as they are in lie detection by demeanor. In fact, the acting abilities of good liars 
probably outstrip the ability of observers to catch them. Arguably, people are not incapable of 
detecting falsehood, but they do so better by textual or content analysis of the communication.112
Demeanor is not a good reason for the hearsay rule, but rather a distractant.
There may be something more to the idea of physical confrontation, but not much more. 
Psychological experiments show that physical proximity is a factor in people’s ability to 
108 See Id.1088.
109 See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN et al., supra note 93, at 73.
110 See generally Olin Guy Wellborn, supra note 93, at 1075-76, 1078-88 (discussing “mounting experimental 
evidence against the utility of demeanor” in assessing credibility; noting, however, that this proposition “contradicts 
orthodox legal assumptions”).
111 See Id. at 1088.
112 See Id. at 1104-05.
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disadvantage others. There is some evidence, in other words, that facial confrontation in which 
the speaker or subject is not anonymous makes the speaker less capable of adverse action against 
the subject.113 But the fact that a witness may be more hesitant to say something adverse to a 
litigant who is present hardly means that we are more likely to get the truth as a result of eye-to-
eye confrontation. We don’t enhance the quality of information that we collect by confronting 
the reporter with all of the adverse consequences that might flow from a truthful answer, and in 
fact we often enhance it, instead, by removing disincentives to truth-telling.114
As for the oath, it seems likely that it has something to do with enhancing truth, but 
again, not as much as one might like to hope.115 In the first place, the oath influences only the so-
called sincerity risk. It does not counteract defects in perceptivity, qualification, expression, or 
bias, except to the extent that it may suppress less-than-perfect-certainty altogether—and then, it 
seems as likely to suppress truth as falsehood. Although the oath probably does have something 
to do with counteracting the sincerity risk in some witnesses, it does so imperfectly, and it may 
result in an imbalance that leads to poor truth detection. If a witness impressed by the oath 
confesses diligently to all uncertainties, while an opposing witness who takes his swearing more 
casually expresses a false but convincing certainty to the contrary, the so-called “Othello effect” 
causes errors in third-party evaluations—and the oath does not help us much.116
113
 Stanley Milgram’s experiments showed this effect in a disturbing way.  A phony “experimenter” (who actually 
was a stooge) persuaded experimental subjects to impose what they thought were painful electric shocks on another 
person who made mistakes in what was falsely presented as a learning experiment.  The willingness of subjects to 
impose these “shocks” was enhanced by physical factors, such as close proximity of the authority and distance of the 
person harmed (e.g., by walling the learner off in another room).  CRUMP, HOW TO REASON 385-86.
114
 This, in fact, is one reason for reposing more faith in double-blind experiments, in which neither the subject nor 
the observer is biased by knowing whether the subject is part of the experimental group or the control group.  
CRUMP, HOW TO REASON 449.
115 See Olin Guy Wellborn, supra note 107, at 1078-91.
116
 This effect is so well recognized in the literature that it has a name:  the “Othello error,” because it is illustrated 
by Othello’s mistaken interpretation of Desdemona’s reaction to Othello’s inaccurate accusation of infidelity.  See
William Shakespeare, Othello, act V; scene ii; PAUL EKMAN, TELLING LIES 170 (1985); Charles F. Bond & 
32
Finally, there is cross examination, which is indeed a valuable tool for discovery of truth, 
if a potentially overrated one. Cross examination gives us text and context. A disinterested 
observer comes away with more parts of the story to compare to others. Furthermore, cross 
examination may uncover defects in perceptivity, qualification, sincerity, expression, and bias. 
“When you use the word ‘red,’ Leake’s son, you really don’t know what it means, do you?” “No, 
I don’t; I don’t speak English very well, and I get ‘red’ mixed up with ‘green’.” “And before the 
accident, Leake’s son, it had been months since you’d seen the light?” “That’s correct. My 
observations were from another time altogether, and I have no idea whether my father fixed the 
light after I saw it, but before the accident.” If this is not enough, we can elicit evidence of bias 
from the witness: “Yes, it’s true, I hate my father and I’d like to see him lose this case.” 
This hypothetical dialogue, of course, is wildly improbable, and hence my assertion that 
cross examination is overrated.  The psychological studies, in fact, strongly support the inference 
that cross-examination can sometimes interfere with, rather than enhance, accurate credibility 
determinations.117  One striking experiment, for example, showed that experienced cross-
examiners were no better than amateurs in questioning identification eyewitnesses to produce 
accurate evaluations of their testimony by neutral decisionmakers—and, in fact, neither did 
better than chance(!)118  This study paints a dismal picture of the efficacy of cross examination, if 
not of our entire system of justice.
William E. Fahey, False Suspicion and the Misperception of Deceit, 26 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 41 (1987), 
cited in Olin Guy Wellborn, supra note 107, at 1081.
117 See PAUL EKMAN, supra note 116, at 162-89; Charles F. Bond et al., supra note 116, at 41.  In fact, Professor 
McCormick suggested that “it is . . . the honest but weak or timid witness, rather than the rogue, who most often 
goes down under the fire of cross-examination.”  CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 31 (3rd ed. 1984).
118 See R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells, and Fergus J. O’Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate 
Eyewitnesses, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 336-38 (1989).
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In any event, there are several responses to the assertion that a uniform exclusion of 
hearsay evidence is preferable to evidence without cross examination. I conclude that cross 
examination is far more valuable in some situations than in others, that it can be substituted for 
by available means short of throwing out all hearsay, and that the existing rules themselves 
demonstrate this point—but they achieve results that are random and arbitrary rather than 
principled.
C. The Case against Solving These Problems by Blanket Exclusion
The question is not whether cross examination of nearly every hearsay declarant would 
be potentially valuable. The answer to that question is, “It potentially would be.” Instead, the 
question is whether cross examination is so uniformly valuable and so impervious to substitutes 
that it should be regarded as essential in all cases, so that information that itself may be valuable, 
such as the son’s statement in Leake v. Hagert, should be flatly excluded. I do not think so.
In the first place, as I have asserted above, jurors are not incapable of perceiving the risks 
that the law has identified as inherent in hearsay evidence (and that in fact are inherent in all 
evidence, including testimony from live witnesses). We do not know from systematic means just 
how likely jurors are to perceive all of these risks on their own, unaided; but that is not the point 
either, because the opponent of the evidence can debunk the value of a given piece of hearsay 
evidence, just as the opponent can debunk the veracity of a witness. “The son of my client, 
Leake, wasn’t here. Hagert’s lawyer could have brought him here if she wanted. The son may 
not have seen the light recently, may have been incapable of telling whether it was out, may have 
been lying when he talked to the insurance investigator, and may hate his father. And what did 
he mean by the phrase, ‘out for some time?’ It proves nothing, ladies and gentlemen of the jury.” 
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I have only anecdotal evidence to offer about this question of jury awareness of hearsay 
risks, and I don’t know that we have anything better, pro or con. But my experience was striking. 
Back in the days when I regularly tried criminal cases, the law of my State provided that only a 
jury could acquit an indicted defendant on grounds of insanity.119 There were some cases in 
which the prosecutor and defense lawyer agreed that the defendant was insane and merited 
acquittal; in fact, although there were many cases where this agreement did not result, cases of 
agreement about insanity were common. Neither side in such a case wanted to waste a full-blown 
jury trial to resolve the non-issue that each side had agreed to, and certainly the judge did not. 
Jury trials are precious; it is astonishing how few we can afford.120 Additionally, the prosecutors 
wanted to avoid bringing in the diagnosing psychiatrist, who had already logged several 400-
dollar hours, to charge travel time to and from the courtroom, sit there several hours with the
meter running, and spend fifteen minutes on the witness stand opining orally about what was 
fully expressed in the psychiatrist’s report. In the view of the county government, the cost of this 
use of the psychiatrist was astronomical, and the practice was roundly discouraged. The parties’ 
natural tendency, then, was to accept the first twelve potential jurors without any voir dire 
examination and to stipulate to the admissibility of the psychiatrist’s report without his being 
present. Then, both parties would present the jurors with their agreed request for acquittal.
The reactions of the resulting juries were extraordinary. Many of them balked at 
acquitting defendants on this basis, even when urged to do so by prosecutors. “Why couldn’t the 
psychiatrist be here?” ”Okay, so it may cost some money, even a lot of money, but the 
psychiatrist should be here.” The jurors were unwilling to accept hearsay from the psychiatrist. 
119 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 46.03 (1975).
120 See generally Gross & Syverud (discussing reasons for the vanishing trial); see also infra Pt. VII of this article 
(same).
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They feared a conspiracy against the public—the acquittal of a guilty individual whom the 
prosecutor wanted falsely to exonerate, with the connivance of the defense lawyer. The jurors 
had seen evidence presented on television in such programs as Perry Mason and Matlock and 
Boston Legal, and they concluded that this wasn’t the way it was supposed to be done. The 
United States Supreme Court said much the same thing in Old Chief v. United States,121 in which 
the Court recognized the need for “evidentiary depth” on the part of a litigant with the burden of 
proof. The jury has expectations, and those expectations are disappointed in some instances if 
jurors are provided only indirect statements.122 Some kinds of hearsay evidence violate the jury’s
sense of proper epistemology. And so, my first point is that the stifling paternalism of the 
hearsay rule may not always be needed, because the jury is at least as capable of evaluating the 
potential defects in hearsay evidence as it is in inferring defects in the testimony of a witness.123
My experience leads me, in fact, to conclude that jurors will be suspicious of hearsay in 
situations when attorneys and courts would accept it. In my mind, jurors often have a stronger 
bias against hearsay than lawyers do.
Which leads to a second point: the hearsay rule is actually a rule of partial admissibility. 
It admits a great deal of hearsay through exceptions and exemptions, as well as by defining 
evidence as non-hearsay even though it is the equivalent of hearsay and carries similar risks. The 
results are arbitrary, however, because the exceptions are the product of historical accident, not 
of policy.124 For example, the exception for an “excited utterance” admits hearsay if it is spoken 
121
 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997).
122 Id. at 188-90.
123 See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
124 See John E.B. Myers, Ingrid Condon, Simona Ghetti & Gail S. Goodman, Hearsay Exceptions: Adjusting the 
Ratio of Intuition to Psychological Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (2002)
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while under the stress of an exciting event.125 The theory is that the required element of stress 
reduces the sincerity risk, because a person under stress does not have the time or presence of 
mind to make up a false story. In the first place, we do not know whether this is so, or whether it 
is true to some degree only.126 In the second place, and more importantly, stress does not 
guarantee against defects in perceptivity, qualification, expression, or bias. In fact, the 
psychology of perception under conditions of stress points in precisely the opposite direction 
from this exception, indicating that hearsay of this kind is distinctly unreliable. The experiments 
show that stress results in distorted perception and reporting—it produces lesser accuracy, not 
greater.127 The ironic result of this exception for excited utterances, however, is that a court 
would be much more likely to admit evidence of Leake’s son’s hearsay statement if he had made 
it under stress—if it had been uttered right after the accident, for example, or in response to a 
shocking revelation by the insurance investigator—even though we would then have less reason 
to credit the statement, and even though the statement as actually uttered, which the rules 
excluded, had greater indicia of truth.
The same criticisms can be made of other exceptions or exemptions. Dying declarations, 
for example, have been the subject of clearly expressed skepticism founded in their asserted lack 
of value as evidence.128 So have statements against interest.129 And arguments of a similar nature 
could be constructed about other rules, ranging from admissions130 to public records.131
125
 Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
126 See John E.B. Myers et al., supra note 124, at 3-8.
127
 “It has often been demonstrated that performance suffers if individuals are exposed to stressful conditions.”  Id. at 
6.
128
 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883), 
excepted in JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, supra note 83, at 138-39 (stating that dying declaration rule 
functions poorly in India, apparently because of a belief that dying persons have no motive for truth telling—e.g., 
they may make deathbed accusations to hurt enemies).
37
If the general admittance of hearsay encounters further objections on grounds of jury 
credulity, we could provide an instruction to the jury suggesting that hearsay should be viewed
with skepticism. We could even provide a statement of the reasons:132
Ladies and gentlemen, the statement of Declarant X was of a character 
that the law regards as “hearsay.” It was the repetition of a statement as evidence 
of what the statement says, without the speaker present. You should consider 
whether this evidence was subject to defects because the opposing parties were 
unable to explore Declarant X’s ability to perceive the subject, qualifications for 
making the statement, accuracy of expression, adherence to sincerely telling the 
truth, or bias. With live witnesses, the law has ways of exploring these matters, 
including cross-examination. Different hearsay statements have different 
probabilities of stating the truth, and it is up to you to evaluate the statement of 
Declarant X with these possible defects in mind.
This kind of instruction seems unnecessary to me, because I believe that juries are perfectly 
capable of reaching these conclusions on their own, or more likely, as aided by the adversary 
guidance of attorneys in opening statements and final argument. But if it is thought that jurors 
need help in generating skepticism about hearsay, this kind of instruction—which the opponent 
of the evidence probably would emphasize as a matter of strategy in opening statements and final 
argument—would supply encouragement of that skepticism.
There are still other alternatives to a blanket exclusion of hearsay. The judge has 
authority, under Rule 403 (which I would retain; see below)133 to exclude particularly weak or 
129 See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (expressing skepticism about such statements; producing 
three-way split of the Court, leaving no clear way of resolving serious admissibility issues remaining under the 
governing rule).
130
 This is particularly true of vicarious admissions attributed to business entities, made without investigation for one 
purpose but offered for another.  Cf. Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 306 Ill. App. 430, 28 N.E.2d 743 (1940) 
(admitting statement by corporation’s manager that employee was acting in scope of employment, made in 
connection with employee’s worker’s compensation claim, but used to prove claim by third party against 
corporation; overruling argument that the statement had been made without personal knowledge, presumably on the 
basis of representations by the same employee who made the compensation claim).
131
 Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) contains complex restrictions that eliminate most uses in criminal cases, although not in 
civil cases.
132
 This instruction would compare favorably in comprehensibility to other kinds of credibility-related instructions.  
Cf. e.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (suggesting, in an appendix, a lengthy and complex 
model instruction about eyewitness testimony).
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unnecessary hearsay as cumulative, misleading, or confusing. Also, the common law rule that 
hearsay is no evidence, invoked for purposes of a directed verdict (or a judgment as a matter of 
law, in federal courts)134 could be reinstated. The result would be that the jury hears all of the 
evidence, but a litigant cannot carry the burden of production without non-hearsay evidence. 
This rule would reverse the result in Sir Walter Raleigh’s case.135 Yet another means of dealing 
with the asserted problem is to require the proponent of the evidence to produce a live witness 
who can be cross-examined about the making, meaning, and context of the questioned statement, 
without requiring that this witness be the person who uttered the statement.
This last proposal—requiring a live witness who can be cross-examined by the opponent, 
and who can put the statement in context—is a potentially powerful response to the criticisms of 
hearsay. Through such a witness, even if he or she is someone other than the declarant, the 
asserted defects of any item of hearsay evidence could be explored in front of the jury. An 
amended rule might say, then, that “hearsay is admissible if authenticated by a sponsoring 
witness who knows of the circumstances of its utterance and who is subject to cross examination 
about the evidentiary risks it may involve.”  In fact, the opponent may be able in many cases to 
cross examine this witness more effectively than she would a declarant who was present. In 
Leake v. Hagert,136 for example, the witness presumably would be the insurance investigator 
who reported having heard the statement. “You don’t know, Mr. Adjuster, whether Leake’s son 
saw the light recently, or whether he only saw it years before the accident?” “No, I don’t.” “You 
don’t know whether he ever saw it, do you?” “No.” “You don’t know of your own personal 
133 See infra Pt. VI of this article.
134 Cf. Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy Co., 23 S.W.3d 372, 388 (Tex. App. 1999) (observing that 
hearsay statements are not evidence and as such may not be used as the basis for judgment.)
135 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
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knowledge whether he was telling the truth, do you?” “I have no way of knowing.” “You don’t 
know what he meant by the phrase, ‘out for some time,’ do you? For example, mightn’t he have 
meant that part of the lens was out, or that it earlier had been out but was repaired at the time?” 
“I don’t know, of course. For all I know, his father had fixed it by the time of the accident.” 
“And in fact, a lot of kids these days dislike their parents and find ways to get back at them. You 
don’t know whether Leake’s son fits in that group, do you?” “For all I know, he may have hated 
his father.” Cross-examining a witness who knows the context of the statement, even if the 
witness is not the declarant, is relatively easy and can be entirely effective in getting the point 
across to the jury.
In fact, prosecutors and defense lawyers in my jurisdiction ultimately used this solution to 
address their agreed-insanity problem, which I have described above.  The defense attorney 
could call himself as a witness.  “My client is unable to separate reality from delusion.  He tells 
elaborate stories about his ‘children,’ but I have learned that he has no children.”  The defense 
lawyer then would mark the psychiatrist’s report as Defense Exhibit 1, have it received by 
stipulation, and explain its contents.  The prosecutor then would cross-examine the defense 
lawyer about the psychiatrist’s report.  The result was juries who understood the evidence and 
who did not have concerns about being fooled.
And lest I be misunderstood, I have no doubt that, even if the process were adversary—if 
the defense lawyer sought acquittal on insanity grounds but the prosecution opposed it—the 
prosecutor would have been entirely effective at cross-examining a substitute expert about the 
psychiatrist’s report, just as the defense lawyer would have been effective at cross-examining a 
substitute about an opposing expert’s report.  The question is academic, because in an adversary 
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situation, both would likely choose to present their experts live, for reasons of jury persuasion.137
The point, however, is that effective cross examination can be supplied in many cases by the 
presence of a witness other than the declarant, and in most such cases, the cross will actually be 
more effective rather than less so.  The concern for cross examination, in other words, does not 
justify a blanket exclusion of hearsay.
D. Criminal Cases: The Right of Confrontation
Criminal cases present certain additional issues. One of the most significant is the 
Confrontation Clause. After Crawford v. Washington138 the effect of the Clause, as interpreted, is 
to exclude hearsay that is “testimonial” in character, unless the declarant is unavailable and has 
been cross examined. I see the Crawford decision as dubious on its merits, because I do not 
agree with the Court’s single-focus rationale depending upon the historical distinction between 
testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay.139 I believe instead that reliability, the consideration 
upon which prior cases had been based140 but that the Court rejected, also was an important 
historical factor,141 and I do not think the Court dealt consistently with counterexamples such as 
dying declarations, statements against interest, and admissions, which admit testimonial hearsay 
because of reliability-related factors.142  Furthermore, I see the Court’s own declarations of 
137 See infra Pt. VIIC of this article (explaining forensic strategies favoring live witnesses); see also supra notes 21-
22 and accompanying text (reporting Supreme Court’s expression of the same theory).
138
 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
139 Id. at 43-57.
140
 Crawford overruled a line of cases that emphasized reliability, including Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
141
 The Court relied heavily in its recounting of history upon Sir Walter Raleigh’s case as supporting its testimonial-
nontestimonial distinction.  See 541 U.S. at 44, 51-52 & n.3 (relying “especially” on that case).  The trouble with 
this reliance, however, is that Raleigh emphatically argued lack of reliability, the very rationale that the Crawford
Court rejected. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
142
 The Court described dying declarations as “[t]he one deviation we have found” and as “sui generis,” and it
relegated this observation to a footnote.  541 U.S. at 56 & n.6.  Just as persuasively, however, the dying declaration 
exception could be offered as a clear counterexample to the Court’s conclusion, showing that reliability is, indeed, 
an important rationale for admitting testimonial hearsay.  Furthermore, the Court’s reference to this “one exception 
we have found” shows that its search was inadequate.  Statements against interest have long been admissible on 
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factors supporting stare decisis143 as supporting retention of the existing line of cases, from 
which the Court in Crawford abruptly departed.144 But that issue, concerning whether 
Washington v. Crawford is incorrectly decided, would require another article by itself, and here, 
I shall take the Crawford decision as correct. The Constitution limits both our rules of evidence 
and our repeal of them, and whatever happens to the hearsay rule, it is necessary for trial 
evidence to conform to the Supreme Court’s requirements. In other words, because of Crawford, 
rightly or wrongly, any modification of the hearsay rule must still result in the exclusion from 
criminal trials of testimonial hearsay if the declarant is not unavailable or was not cross 
examined. 
But this limitation, though it must be strictly observed, does not mandate the exclusion of 
any other kind of hearsay. In particular, civil trials are not affected by the Confrontation Clause, 
and neither are issues in criminal cases where the Clause does not require exclusion. Therefore, 
these constitutional considerations furnish no reason, for example, for the exclusion of the good 
evidence that resulted in Leake v. Hagert.145 And for reasons that I will develop later in this 
article, as long as the Compulsory Process Clause is meaningful, the natural strategies of the 
opposing parties furnish a counteractant to hearsay risks in criminal cases as well.146 In 
reliability grounds even if testimonial, as is shown by Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994).  Another 
example concerns admissions, which were an exception to the hearsay rule at common law even if testimonial in 
nature, on grounds involving reliability.
143 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (articulating factors favoring stare decisis); Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (same).
144
 The Court in Crawford made no effort to justify its departure from Roberts by reference to the factors in Casey
and Payne, but decided to abandon stare decisis because Roberts’s “unpardonable vice” was that it admitted 
evidence that the Founders “plainly meant to exclude,” 541 U.S. at 63.  In other words, the departure from stare 
decisis was based on disagreement about this issue, not on factors that excuse compliance with stare decisis.  The 
Court referred to “confusion” created by the reliability standard in Roberts, 541 U.S. at 62-63, but it did not and 
could not predict that its new standard would reduce that confusion.
145 See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
146 See infra Pt. VIIC of this article.
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summary, I believe that, even in criminal cases, the jury’s ability to evaluate hearsay risks, the 
interest of adversary counsel in pointing them out, jury instructions describing hearsay and 
encouraging suspicion, rules requiring non-hearsay evidence for sufficiency purposes, and the 
natural strategies of counsel that I shall describe in Part VII, would provide powerful tools to 
limit concerns about hearsay, so that a blanket rule excluding constitutionally admissible hearsay 
results in an excess of disadvantages over advantages. 
E. Selective Retrenchment of the Hearsay Rule
So far, the arguments that I have made would support the complete elimination of the 
hearsay rule, except to the extent that exclusion is required by the Confrontation Clause. I
believe that that outcome might well be preferable to the regime we have now, in which the rule 
excludes good evidence along with bad, on the basis of considerations that frequently have little 
to do with the difference.147 This belief is strengthened by the availability of alternate protections 
against the hearsay risks, as well as by the weakness of the existing protections.148 In particular, 
outside the purview of the Confrontation Clause, concerns about demeanor, the oath, and eye-to-
eye presence seem unlikely to exclude bad evidence any more than they exclude good evidence, 
and unfortunately, the jury’s ability to detect falsehood in witnesses, even after cross 
examination, is likely to prove no better than its ability to perceive the risks inherent in 
hearsay.149
Nevertheless, cross examination provides a rationale for retention of the hearsay rule in 
some cases. This rationale is partially undercut when the witness is available to the opposing 
party, who can use compulsory process to exercise the right to cross-examine unless to do so is 
147 Cf. supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text (examining instances in which rules produce admissibility results 
arguably inconsistent with policy).
148 See supra Pt. IB of this article.
149 See supra Pt. IB of this article.
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unreasonably difficult.150 But there could be cases of spoliation and of arranged hearsay: that is, 
a party with a motive to do so might cause a witness to create oral or written hearsay deliberately 
for use at trial and then procure the absence of that witness. In a later section, I shall develop 
reasons why this practice is likely to be unusual, but the possibility exists.151 Then, too, retention 
of the hearsay rule is supported by its entrenched position in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Its 
complete abolition is a political impossibility. But the reasons for retention of this exclusionary 
principle do not furnish an argument against cutting it back selectively. What, then, are some 
partial reforms, short of abolishing the hearsay rule, that might limit its effect in excluding good 
evidence?
First, as a small step, consider unavailability. Other than as mandated by the 
Confrontation Clause, unavailability of the witness should be abolished as a requirement for any 
hearsay exception. This article has already examined the negative effects that the unavailability 
requirement imposes, particularly in small cases in which hearsay exceptions could furnish 
important, reliable information.152 The former testimony exception, for example, admits evidence 
that has been subjected to the oath and to cross examination, and usually to eye-to-eye 
confrontation as well; accordingly, proof of unavailability, which may drive up expenses 
inordinately, should not be required.153 Furthermore, if the opponent wants live testimony from 
the witness, the opponent can produce the witness if the witness is available;154 the opponent’s 
failure to do so, coupled with dog-in-the-manger arguments for exclusion, is the best indicator 
150 See infra Pt. VIIC of this article.
151 See infra Pt. VIIC of this article.
152 See supra Pt. IB of this article; see infra Pt. VIIB of this article.
153
 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) requires not only unavailability, but also the oath and cross examination.  It also requires 
a “proceeding” or deposition, at which the opponent usually will have the opportunity to be present.
154 See infra Pt. VIIB of this article.
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that either unavailability exists or that the opponent does not really want the witness.  Other 
exceptions requiring unavailability do not mirror the protections against hearsay risks so 
completely, but they do admit of the possibility that the opponent could call an available witness 
if desired rather than seek exclusion altogether, and they are based upon considerations having to 
do with the trustworthiness and reliability of the evidence.155  Eliminating the unavailability 
requirement for nontestimonial evidence and in civil trials, therefore, would minimize both the 
additional admittance of bad evidence and the exclusion of good evidence—which ought to be 
the objective.
Second, for similar reasons, the exclusion in civil cases of deposition evidence without 
unavailability should be reversed.156 This, too, is a modest step. A deposition supplies the most 
important protections against hearsay risks—oath and cross-examination—and it makes likely 
the existence of eye-to-eye confrontation, since the opposing party often is present, and it even 
supplies demeanor evidence if the deposition has been videotaped.157 If the opponent wants the 
presence of an available witness, the opponent can supply it, and again, the opponent’s efforts at 
exclusion, without producing the witness itself, is a strong indicator that obtaining the witness 
live is impractical or that the opponent’s strategy is better served by foregoing the protections 
against hearsay risks. The costs and unpredictability created by the exclusionary principle are 
significant, as is shown by the discussion of Frechette v. Welch, above.  The Federal Rules 
should be revised to admit depositions without consideration of unavailability.
155 See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2)-(4) (creating exceptions for statements under belief of impending death, statements 
against interest, and statements of personal or family history).  Rule 804(b)(6), “Forfeiture by wrongdoing,” is based 
upon separate policies, but may also reflect concerns about trustworthiness and necessity.
156 See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.  The exclusion is mandated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 32, which actually 
is a rule of evidence.
157 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 28-32.
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Third, the residual exception to the hearsay rule158 should be broadened. In particular, the 
requirement that the proponent show that the evidence in question is better than any other 
reasonably available evidence should be removed.159 The existence of other, available evidence 
does not measure the value of the excluded information, because the particular piece of evidence 
may dovetail with other evidence in the case to produce a preponderance that otherwise would be 
absent. In other words, the persuasiveness of the evidence may be significant even if there is 
other evidence on point; it may tip the scale. The rule, as thus amended, would admit hearsay 
that has particularized guarantees of reliability,160 the admittance of which is consistent with the 
policies of the rules and the interests of justice.161  The use of the no-better-evidence factor in 
addition to these requirements, to exclude tip-the-scales evidence merely because there is other 
evidence of the fact at issue, disserves the search for truth to no sound purpose. In Leake v. 
Hagert, for example, the important evidence furnished by the son’s definitive statement against
his father’s case probably would be excluded under the current residual exception, simply 
because Hagert was present and Hagert also was an eyewitness.162 The proposed elimination of 
the no-better-evidence criterion would make the son’s statement admissible to tip the scales, 
precisely because it is good evidence that cannot be supplied otherwise as a practical matter. It 
would even defeat the possibility of spoliation by the father, in the form of possible procurement 
of the unavailability of the witness.163 This reconfiguration of the residual exception would go 
158
 Fed. R. Evid. 807.
159
 The current Rule requires that the evidence be shown to be “more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the opponent can procure through reasonable efforts.”  Fed. R. 807(B).  This 
requirement can exclude highly reliable evidence that would tip the scales.
160
 Fed. R. Evid. 807 (requiring “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness).
161
 Fed. R. Evid. 807(C).
162 See supra Pt. IIA of this article.
163 See infra notes 271-72 and accompanying text for discussion of this possibility.
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far to remedy injustices created by witness unavailability, while doing little violence to the 
purposes of the rules of evidence. An expanded residual exception would not operate in criminal 
cases, under the assumptions of this article, if the witness were available or the evidence 
testimonial; but it could operate soundly in civil cases and in criminal cases in which there is a 
trustworthy, non-testimonial statement from an unavailable witness.
Fourth, the current regime could be replaced by the original House of Representatives 
version of the hearsay rule. That version, as I have observed above,164 would have admitted 
hearsay evidence that was trustworthy and reliable, with the existing hearsay exceptions listed as 
nonexclusive examples. The result would be tantamount to an exception admitting hearsay on the 
basis of two criteria: necessity and trustworthiness. The courts presumably would create new 
categories of recognizably admissible evidence, much in the manner of common law evolution. 
This kind of evidence could not be admitted in criminal cases if it were testimonial or if the 
declarant were available, but it would build flexibility that would help to reverse the exclusion of 
good evidence that now is mandated categorically by the hearsay rule. In Leake v. Hagert, for 
example, this non-categorical, trustworthiness-and-necessity approach would provide for 
admissibility of the son’s evidence in a systematic way, without the strictures of the residual 
exception.
I would go farther than these changes, myself. In particular, I would prefer to see 
principles allowing the admittance of evidence regardless of the hearsay rule under 
circumstances in which the jury can soundly evaluate the supposed risks of hearsay.165 This 
approach, similarly, would invite the courts to create a kind of common law of broader 
admissibility than exists today. In addition to requiring consideration of the jury’s ability to 
164 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
165 See supra Pt. IIC of this article.
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evaluate the risks in and of itself, I would condition admissibility upon an instruction of the kind 
sketched above,166 upon the ability of counsel to explain the risks in opening statement and 
argument, upon the unlikelihood of spoliation by deliberate creation of the evidence coupled 
with procurement of unavailability,167 and upon production of a witness able to testify about the 
circumstances of the statement and about the possibility that the hearsay risks taint the 
statement.168 I believe that the strategies of counsel, the relative abilities of juries to evaluate 
statements and live testimony, and the need for less technical rules of exclusion, all support this 
approach,169 although I recognize that, unlike the smaller steps sketched above, it has little 
chance of immediate acceptance.
III. REPETITIVE-BEHAVIOR170 EVIDENCE: 
SHOULD SIMILAR EPISODES OF MISCONDUCT 
BE ADMISSIBLE?
Success in navigating everyday challenges requires us to make judgments about the 
actions of other individuals from their repetitive behaviors. A law professor knows that a certain 
student is likely to be ready to answer questions, while another is not. She knows that her 
husband is thoughtful, or not, and that her dean is a willing fundraiser, or not. People are 
probably as skilled at making these kinds of judgments as they are about evidentiary matters that 
routinely are admitted in lawsuits: e.g., does flight provide evidence of guilt?171  Furthermore, 
166 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
169 See infra Pt. VIIC of this article; see supra Pts. IC, IIB of this article.
170
 This kind of evidence often is referred to, vaguely, as “character” evidence.  It is very different, however, from 
the kind of evidence provided by general “character witnesses,” which is treated by the rules as dubious and 
therefore generally excluded, although tolerable in narrow instances.  See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a).  I view concrete 
instances of repetitive behavior as presenting a distinct problem, and therefore, rather than the pejorative label of 
“character” evidence, I prefer the term “repetitive behavior” evidence.
171
 Flight often involves the commission of separate crimes that create a greater balance of prejudice over probativity 
because they do not support even an inference of repetitive conduct, and they may involve violence.  See, e.g., 
48
some of those routinely admitted kinds of evidence involve prejudice as severe as or more severe 
than, repetitive-behavior evidence.172
Of course, inductive reasoning, which is how we make these judgments about repetitive 
behavior, is fallible. Bertrand Russell tells the sad story of a chicken who runs each day to greet 
the farmer, who feeds the chicken, but one day, the farmer wrings the chicken’s neck, which, 
after all, is the purpose of chickens. Russell’s blunt conclusion is that it would be better for the 
chicken if its inductive processes were “less crude.”173 As human beings, we must develop the 
ability to make both reasonably accurate conclusions that we can draw from induction about 
other human beings and a sense of the limits or fallacies inherent in that reasoning. A person may 
be surprised to see his friend John, who “always is late,” arrive right on time, explaining that 
“I’ve made a New Year’s resolution to be punctual.” The fact is, we make attribution errors, as 
the psychologists would label them, about human behavior.174  We may also be uneducated about 
those situations in which past behavior is a guide to the future and those in which it is not, but is 
merely situational.175  There is no reason to conclude otherwise, however, than that we are as 
United States v. Jackson, 405 F.Supp. 938 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J.).  The inference is composed of a chain of 
sub-inferences about human behavior, each link of which is debatable.
172 Cf. Id. (announcing complex and debatable discretionary ruling that admitted flight and falsehood evidence but 
eliminated arguable high-probativity facts because of concerns about asserted prejudice); United States v. Peltier, 
585 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1978) (upholding admittance of flight evidence that included multiple crimes of violence, 
multiple weapons crimes, and “traveling arsenals linked by communications devices and code words”).  
173 See CRUMP, HOW TO REASON 8-9.
174 Id. 379-80.  This is an insidious error, and the general prohibition on vague character-witness evidence (although 
not the prohibition on repetitive-conduct evidence) arguably can be justified by it.  The “fundamental attribution 
error,” strikingly illustrated in the Napolitan-Goethals experiment, is the excessive attribution of friendliness or 
aloofness to “dispositional” factors (the actor) rather than “situational” factors (transitory events).  Id.  A rude and 
abrupt colleague, in other words, may exhibit this behavior because she is tired or in a hurry, but we tend to attribute 
it to her personality.  This kind of attribution experiment shows little, however, about whether we are justified in 
inferring that a repetitive burglar is less or more likely to be guilty of a burglary proved by additional evidence.
175 Cf. David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 
58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1986) (proposing admittance of specific-acts evidence by defendants and including 
analysis of psychological literature showing conditions under which it is persuasive, including repetitive behavior 
with respect to violation or non-violation of societal norms); David Crump, How Should We Treat Character 
Evidence Offered to Prove Conduct?, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 279 (1987) (responding to Leonard).
49
good with these kinds of judgments about human behavior as we are about many other kinds of 
information that would be allowed freely into evidence in a trial.176  Furthermore, the inference, 
that persons who have engaged in particular kinds of highly improper  behavior in the past, are 
likely as a group to correlate with the group of people who will engage in similar kinds of 
behavior in the future, is a better inference than those that psychologists find to be subject most 
often to error.177
In other words, evidence of repetition of behavior, or propensity, can be good evidence. 
People who commit armed robberies on particular occasions are more likely to commit them on 
other occasions. For other kinds of crimes, such as child molestation or heroin possession, the 
inference of repetition is even stronger; in fact, it is powerful.178 Evidence of commission of a 
particular kind of crime on one occasion does not furnish proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
commission of another particular crime by itself, but then neither does flight. If we truly needed 
to hide the facts from jurors to prevent erroneous inferences from this kind of information, then I 
would argue that we would be forced to conclude that our entire jury trial system would be 
suspect: too unreliable to trust.
The existing general rule about repetitive behavior evidence begins with the proposition 
that evidence of similar crimes is inadmissible to prove propensity.179 There are said to be 
several reasons. First, the defendant, it is asserted, should be held responsible only for the 
offense of indictment; second, the jury should not have the opportunity to overvalue the 
176 See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
178 See Jennifer B. Siverts, Punishing Thoughts Too Close To Reality: A New Solution to Protect Children from 
Pedophiles, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 393, 395 (2005) (quoting recidivism rates as high as 95%); Sana Lowe, 
The Criminalization of the Addictions: Toward a Unified Approach, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 281, 316 (2003)
(explaining high rate of crime repetition for crimes involving dependency-inducing drugs).
179
 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (excluding evidence offered to prove “action in conformity”).
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inference to be drawn from other offenses; and third, similar-crimes evidence can create unfair 
surprise.180 None of these arguments, however, is persuasive. It is extremely unlikely that very 
many juries, after repeatedly being told the opposite during voir dire, opening statement, jury 
instructions, and final argument, will believe that they lawfully can simply substitute another 
crime that is not in the indictment for the charges before them.181 As for the second rationale, it is 
entirely plausible that a jury could overvalue evidence of similar crimes, but no more so than it 
could overvalue any other kind of obviously admissible evidence, from DNA to eyewitness 
identification.182 If we excluded everything a jury might overvalue, nothing would be left. In 
fact, the distinctness of other-crimes evidence—the obviousness of the proposition that evidence 
about a totally separate event does not allow conviction by mere deductive processes—makes 
other-crimes evidence far less subject to overvaluation than eyewitness or DNA evidence. Those 
are more direct proofs of guilt, with lesser chains of inference and with their defects often 
hidden;183 other-crimes evidence, by way of contrast, is (by definition) about crimes distinct 
from the one on trial, a fact that is unlikely to be lost to any juror. Finally, the proposition that 
other-crimes evidence will result in unfair surprise is singularly unpersuasive. Even if notice 
rules were not in place, I would venture to say that virtually one hundred percent of the time, the 
defense knows about allegations of other similar crimes that are known to the prosecution. 
180 See, e.g., United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975).
181
 The trial of entertainers Michael Jackson is a forceful example of the jury’s ability.  It involved proof of several 
other crimes involving sexual improprieties with children, some of them involving disgusting facts, but the primary 
charge was vulnerable to witness impeachment, and the jury acquitted him of this single charge although the 
evidence supported a strong inference that he must have been guilty of some crime or crimes.  See [newspaper or 
news magazine stories covering several instances, and the outcome.]
182 Cf. DAVID CRUMP et al., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 223-
33 (2005) (exploring force and fallacies of these kinds of evidence).
183 See authority cited in supra note 182.
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Actually, however, this rationale is unnecessary, because notice requirements in the Federal 
Rules184 effectively negate the surprise theory.
But this is not all of the character-evidence rule. Our principles suffer from multiple-
personality disorder, because the rule goes on to provide that evidence of other, similar crimes is 
not excluded for the purpose of demonstrating intent, identity, or other non-propensity 
purposes.185 The result is that other crimes are excluded if they are similar—but not if they are 
closely similar! The prosecution, then, approaches the trial with a chart of similarities: the robber 
in another crime, who is identified as this defendant, used a gun, threats, and a mask similar to 
the ones in this trial. The defense prepares a chart to the opposite effect, emphasizing the 
differences: witnesses’ height descriptions, escape vehicles, and clothing of the persons in the 
two robberies were different.186 The judge then has the task of deciding whether the differences 
are such that the main thrust of the evidence is propensity or whether the similarities support 
inferences of intent or identity that are not overwhelmed by the differences.187
The trouble is, this abstraction may interfere with sound reasoning about guilt or 
innocence. In the first place, the distinction between “propensity” and “intent or identity” as the 
object of proof here is unclear; in fact, it is a metaphysical conundrum.188 Inferences of intent or 
identity, in such a case, are founded on inferences about propensity to commit similar acts. 
Inferences of intent or identity are inferences about propensity.  In the second place, and more 
importantly, the admissibility judgment required of the court is so imprecise that it necessarily 
184
 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
185 Id.
186 Cf. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Crim. 1996) (reproducing exactly such data, in chart form).
187
 This balancing is required by Fed. R. Evid. 403.  See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
188 Cf. PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN et al., supra note 83, at 345 (posing problem about Munchausen-by-proxy syndrome 
in which parent is motivated to injure child repeatedly, in order to gain sympathy from later caring for child; 
suggesting that “propensity” and “motive” are inseparable, although the latter admits the evidence while the former 
excludes it).
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will be determined more by the judge’s idiosyncratic preferences than by the underlying rules. 
Decisions about how strong the intent-identity inference is, how strong the propensity inference 
is (to the extent it is even possible to separate propensity from intent or identity), and whether the 
latter substantially outweighs the former,189 are so indeterminate that the elaborate decision 
structure mandated by the rules hardly controls them.
And then, there are Rules 413 through 415. In sexual assault cases, similar crimes are 
more readily admissible, even if they are not precisely similar. A defendant accused of rape or of 
sexual abuse of a child cannot use the usual exclusionary principle of Rule 404(b) to prevent the 
jury from hearing evidence that he committed another crime of rape or sexual abuse.190 The 
ironic result is illustrated by considering the trials of a robbery case in courtroom A and a rape 
case in courtroom B, next door. For each defendant, let us imagine, there is evidence of the 
commission of six other crimes of similar nature, although not similar enough to support 
sufficient inferences of intent or identity. The robbery case in courtroom A will feature evidence 
only of the single robbery in the indictment. All evidence about similar conduct by the defendant 
will be suppressed in courtroom A. But in courtroom B, the evidence will not be so confined. 
The jury will hear about the crime on trial in courtroom B, and also, entirely differently from the 
jury in courtroom A, the jury in courtroom B will freely hear evidence of the six other rapes.
The difference in these sexual assault rules is sometimes traced to the so-called “lustful 
disposition theory”: the inference that, when there is evidence of multiple rapes, one can detect 
evidence of a motive, or a lustful disposition, which assertedly is distinct from propensity. There 
189 See supra note 187.
190
 Fed. R. Evid. 413-15.
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are common law cases to this effect.191 The theory arguably has appeal to the extent that repeated 
crimes of any kind can be said to reveal a motive, but labeling such a “motive” as “lust” hardly 
distinguishes it from “propensity.” One might just as accurately say that repeated drug 
possession offenses show a motive of drug dependency (in fact, that seems a better inference), or 
that serial murderers or repeat robbers exhibit a “disposition’ toward their respective crimes. A 
slightly better argument for the different treatment of sexual assaults, but one that still does not 
support the conclusion, is that rape is a particularly malignant and grossly under-reported crime. 
Yes, it is malignant and under-reported, but there are other under-reported and malignant crimes 
that do not feature this evidentiary approach. Finally, there is another explanation: the lobbying 
efforts of feminists, who particularly targeted rape, coincided with the inclinations of a Senate 
Judiciary Committee that favored broad admissibility of evidence in criminal cases. In other 
words, the difference between the usual character rules and Rules 413 through 415 is the product 
of political forces.192
Fine, a critic of the sexual-assault rules might say; the solution is to repeal the rules that 
admit other-rape evidence. Then, if we exclude repetitive behavior evidence in all cases, the 
critic would argue, the anomaly disappears. Yes, it does, but one should question whether the 
resulting regime would be more productive of justice. Consider two high-profile rape cases from 
real life, one brought against William Kennedy Smith, the well-financed nephew of President 
John F. and Senator Ted Kennedy,193 and the other brought against sports announcer Marvin 
191 See Hodge v. United States, 126 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1942).  For a case rejecting this theory but discussing both 
sides, see Lannan v. State, 600 N.W.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992).
192 See R. Wade King, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By Answering the Public’s Call for Increased 
Protection from Sexual Predators, Did Congress Move Too Far Toward Encouraging Conviction Based on 
Character Rather than Guilt?, TEX. TECH L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2002).
193 See Mark Hansen, Experts Expected Smith Verdict: Even a Perfect Prosecutor Can Lose Date Rape Cases, 
Pundits Say, ABA J., Feb. 1992, at 18, excerpted in PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 83, at 279; David 
Margolick, Why Jury in Smith Case Never Heard from 3 Other Women, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1991, at B14.
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Albert.194 The two cases were strikingly similar, down to the existence of evidence of at least two 
parallel rapes committed by each defendant, each with significant similarities to the offenses on 
trial. Each was defended by Roy Black, a skillful and nationally known Florida lawyer. Smith 
was tried in Florida, which features particularly strict exclusion of similar-crimes evidence in 
rape cases as well as other trials. Some of the Florida precedents would be amusing if not so 
grimly serious: in one case, for example, Florida mandated exclusion of a crime of violence 
similar to the one on trial with the observation that the victim’s hands had been tied in back in 
both cases, but not with the same implements.195 The trial court in Smith’s case excluded all 
evidence of the other offenses committed by Smith, even though they featured very similar 
modus operandi. He was acquitted.196 Albert, on the other hand, faced trial in the District of 
Columbia, where the Federal Rules allowed similar-crimes evidence in rape cases. The 
admissibility of two other offenses, which featured behavior in biting the victims similar to that 
in the case in chief, persuaded Black and Albert to offer a plea of guilty.197
I would argue that it is poor epistemology to isolate the one victim of William Kennedy 
Smith over which Florida had jurisdiction, to force the jury to consider her evidence alone, and 
to suppress the evidence of two other independent reporters who were victims of a similar modus 
operandi. I would like to see cases of this kind handled as Marvin Albert’s was. There would be 
objectants who would vaguely assert, “That’s not fair,” by which they would mean that it is not 
proper to deprive the defendant of the defense of consent by disproving it with what a jury may 
regard as strong evidence of his guilt, but that custom has not credited.  I do not accept this 
194 John Leo, The Recycling of Reputations, 135 U.S. News & World Rep. 56, Oct. 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/031020/20john.htm. 
195
 Drake v. State, 400 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1981).  Florida’s Williams rule excluded the evidence unless the similarities 
were highly particularized, like a signature.  Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
196 See authorities cited in supra note 196.
197 See authorities cited in supra note 197.
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objection, and I would support admitting all of the evidence that is relevant, as this other-acts 
evidence is.  If strong evidence of guilt, as seen from a juror’s position, is available, it should be 
shared with the jury.  The jury would be required to find the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, of course, and it would be repeatedly told that it must find that guilt, if at all, 
with respect to the crime charged in the indictment.198 But the jury would be playing with a full 
deck, with all of the relevant information, and not with a major fact suppressed, one that any sane 
person would consider important. And furthermore, I can see no justification for excluding 
evidence of a similar kind in a robbery, drug sale, or murder case.199
One recent phenomenon that all lawyers should fear is the unwillingness of citizens to 
serve on juries,200 an unwillingness that probably proceeds, at least in part, from many citizens’ 
concerns that the truth will be hidden from them by irrational rules. Jurors hate to be fooled, and 
when it comes to character evidence, citizens are right to feel this concern. The character 
evidence rules exclude evidence that ordinary people would recognize immediately as 
meaningful, even as they would recognize that the evidence is not alone determinative, and that 
it does not address the issue directly—it is circumstantial only. Rule 404(b), the principal 
repetitive-behavior rule, should be revised along the lines of Rules 413 through 415. As is true in 
the case of those rules, evidence of significantly dissimilar crimes should be excluded on the 
basis of the Rule 403 calculus.201  In other words, evidence of a completely different kind of 
198 See CRUMP, CRIMINAL CASE 79, 85, 108-09, 111-12, 115 (reflecting instructions from both prosecutor and 
defense during voir dire to this effect, jury argument by defense referring to explicit instructions by court, and 
court’s own instructions).
199
 There is, in fact, wide agreement among scholars that recidivism data support making the repetitive behavior 
inference more strongly in other kinds of cases than those involving sexual assaults.  See authorities cited in infra
note 204.
200 Cf. David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1997) (giving examples).
201
 United States v. Guardia, 955 F.Supp. 115 (D. N.M. 1997) (holding that Rule 403 applies to evidence admissible 
under Rules 413-15 and can exclude it).
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crime should be excluded on the ground that the prejudice it creates in the form of general dislike 
of the defendant substantially outweighs the probative value inherent in the inference of 
repetitive conduct. Likewise, diffuse character attacks, of the kind that sometimes have been 
reported in the judge-only trials of civil law countries,202 would be prohibited by application of 
Rule 403, and defensive character witnesses offering general good-character evidence should 
continue to be governed by Rule 405.203 But inferences of repetitive conduct founded on 
offenses similar in kind and rare in the general population are sufficiently within the competence 
of juries to support admissibility of this evidence. As Professor Park puts it (although I have no 
reason to believe that he supports the proposal I am making here),204
[A]n assessment of the probative value of other-crime character evidence requires 
a comparison of the criminal propensity of prior offenders with the criminal 
propensity of other persons [as well as consideration of recidivism data].  When a 
given crime has a low incidence in the general population, the probative value of 
evidence of another instance of the same crime will be greater than would have 
been the case had the crime been more common . . . . 
The current rules, which hide this kind of sensible inference from those it conscripts as 
decisionmakers, are unfair to citizens who serve as jurors as well as to the cause of justice.
IV. EXPERTS AND OPINION EVIDENCE: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S UNSATISFACTORY JURISPRUDENCE
202 See JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, supra note 83, at 396-97 (excerpting from pp. 79-81 of Albert 
Camus, The Stranger, suggesting that defendant’s alleged lack of visible emotion at his mother’s funeral would be 
admissible as character evidence in prosecution for an unrelated alleged murder of  a third person).  Rule 403 
excludes such evidence in American criminal trials.
203
 Fed. R. Evid. 405 (allowing reputation or opinion evidence).
204
 Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASINGS L.J. 717, 762-64 (1998).  For other views of this 
issue, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character Evidence 
Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 287 
(1995) (suggesting, contrary to Park, that high-recidivism crimes are more appropriate candidates for treatment by 
admitting repetitive behavior evidence); Katherine K. Baker, Once a Rapist?  Motivation and Relevancy in Rape 
Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 578-79 (1997) (making the same point about sexual assaults but generally opposing 
the evidence).
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Next, let us consider rules that exclude expert opinion.  The Supreme Court has left the 
law of expert witnesses hopelessly confused. I have written about the subject elsewhere, and 
there is no reason to repeat everything said there, as opposed to referring the reader to that 
article.205 A brief synopsis, I hope, will be enough. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,206 our most egocentric Justice, Justice Blackmun,207 ignored the dissenting advice of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist,208 who argued that the Court had insufficiently grasped the problem to provide 
a definitive test for science. Justice Blackmun went on to attempt just that, by providing a 
confused version of the philosophy of science of Sir Robert Popper.209 There are other 
philosophies of science, with Popper’s being a relatively narrow one;210 the Supreme Court not 
only misunderstood it, but also chose it to the exclusion of theories that would fit better in some 
205
 David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho: Reconsidering the Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 68 
MO. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter cited as Crump, Daubert].  For commentary on this article, see Edward J. 
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 For sheer self-absorption, Justice Blackmun’s separate opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
922-43 (1992), has to be read to be believed.  After comparing his own opinions to a “flickering candle” that “has 
grown bright” because of the concurrence of other judges in that belief in this particular case, and after expressing 
his “fear for the darkness” represented by the beliefs of the other “four Justices” who disagreed with him, Justice 
Blackmun added, “I am 83 years old.  I cannot remain on this court forever . . . ,” as if the fate of civilization 
depended on his beliefs alone.  The same egocentrism, although not as transparent, may have caused this Justice to 
venture farther into conjecture in Daubert than a more restrained jurist would have thought prudent.
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 509 U.S. at 598-600.
209 Id. at 594.  For example, the Court seems to have confused the work of Popper with that of Hempel, whom the 
Court cited for related propositions, Id., but whose philosophy is very different.  See Susan Haack, Trial and Error: 
The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Supp. 1, Public Health Matters, 566-68 
(2005).  Thus, it confused “scientific” with “reliable” when it created its falsifiability criterion.  Id.  Beyond that, the 
Court confuses “testable” with “has been tested”; the former (testable) would apply even to an assertion that not 
only has not been tested, but that we don’t know yet how to test.
210 See, Id.; KARL R. POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH 18, 22 (1972) 
(asserting that scientific confirmation, as opposed to falsification, is impossible, and that failure to falsify “says 
nothing whatever . . . about the ‘reliability’ of a theory”); CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC 
EXPLANATION AND OTHER ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 3-46, 47-51 (1965) (allowing for 
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contexts.211 The Court purported, then, to identify four factors indicative of reliability that the 
Court said were nonexclusive.212 As the Court should have recognized would happen, these have 
become the “Daubert factors,” often relied on as an exclusive list, despite the Court’s insistence 
that they were nonexclusive.213 The Court also created a requirement of evidentiary “fit” or 
relevance but gave an example of evidentiary fit or relevance that was not a very good example 
of evidentiary fit or relevance.214 Worse yet, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,215 the Court 
extended Daubert to nonscientific witnesses. The Daubert criteria, it said, were to be consulted 
for all expert opinions, nonscientific as well as scientific, although only to the extent that they 
might be helpful,216 and with “leeway”217—a direction to the lower courts to apply Daubert to all 
scientific witnesses, followed by a direction not to do so.
All applications of scientific theory to concrete historical questions require a degree of 
judgment, and that judgment is often the essence of the question of reliability. Does experience 
about throat cancer provide evidence that can be helpful in answering a question about stomach 
211 See Crump, Daubert 32-39 (proposing other factors, with reference to other philosophies of science).
212
 509 at 594-95.
213 See Crump, Daubert 40.
214
 The Court observed that while information about phases of the moon might “fit” the question of the relative 
darkness of a certain night, it would not “fit” the question whether an individual “was unusually likely to have 
behaved irrationally on that night.”  But the later conjecture (which might be called the “werewolf inference”) is 
excludable not because it does not “fit,” but because it thoroughly flunks the Court’s separate concept of 
“reliability.”  If the werewolf inference could be established as a “reliable” scientific principle, then ironically, it 
probably would “fit,” because it predicts an outcome that precisely answers the assumed issue; but this is like 
asking, “If planets were bigger than stars, how far away would they be?,” because the werewolf inference is not 
“reliable.”
     A better example might be given by stating that Boyle’s Law (a “reliable” principle, presumably, within limits) 
“fits” for approximating the relationship between pressures, volumes, and temperature of ideal gases.  It does not.
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cancer?218 Is evidence about a new type of DNA analysis, with higher error rates than earlier 
types, sufficiently reliable to tell a jury something of value about a question for which an 
imprecise answer is still helpful? Daubert provided no answer to the first question and supported 
multiple conflicting answers, without any indication of proper resolution, for the second. Under 
this sloppy influence, one trial court even decided that fingerprint identifications were 
inadmissible, by conscientiously applying the Daubert factors (although the court later retracted 
this strange holding).219 The worst thing about the exclusionary opinion in the fingerprint case
was that the court’s analysis faithfully followed Daubert and applied it honestly to the situation 
before it. The flaw was not in the court’s decision, but in the Daubert decision itself.
The four Daubert factors of falsifiability (or actual testing, which the court confused with 
falsifiability, although it is quite different),220 peer review, error rate, and breadth of acceptance, 
which produced that strange result in the fingerprint identification case, are to be applied, Kumho 
says, to all expert witnesses221—meaning, to financial witnesses, economists, accident 
reconstructionists, and gang terminology experts. Against all reason, the Supreme Court insisted 
that these criteria could even apply to some degree to an expert perfume sniffer, one who is able 
to identify any of hundreds of ingredients in a scent.222 The question, “Has anyone tested the 
principles by which you claim to detect this ingredient in this perfume mixture?” or, “What are 
your error rates?” seem poor indicators of proper admissibility in such a case, but the Supreme 
Court left us in a position where those are the relevant questions. The factors apply even more 
218 Cf. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (considering evidence presenting a similar kind  of “fit” 
question).
219
 United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp.2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (excluding identification), vacated by 188 F. 
Supp.2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (reversing exclusion).
220 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.  But see supra note 209.
221 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149-50.
222 Id. at 151.
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poorly to a gang-terminology expert. “So, you claim that the phrase ‘sleeping with the fishes’ 
means ‘dead.’ Are there any principles that you used to determine that this conclusion is 
‘falsifiable’?” (The response is likely to be, “Huh?”) Then: “Have those principles, governing 
‘sleeping with the fishes,’ been peer-reviewed or made the subject of publication?” (“I have no 
idea.”) “What error rates attach to the principles that you allegedly used?” (“Well, none.”) “Are 
your principles generally accepted by other gang-terminology experts?” (“No, only by those who 
regularly watch The Sopranos.”) A lower court ought to be able to apply an opinion of the 
Supreme Court according to its terms, but if the Court’s opinion in Kumho is read according to 
its terms, this is the kind of nonsense that results.
It might be objected, “But the gang terminology expert doesn’t purport to use 
‘principles.’ The expert is just testifying from experience, almost as a percipient witness would, 
to the effect that he has often heard the phrase, ‘sleeping with the fishes,’ always in a context 
where its connotation was equivalent to ‘dead.’ He’s not trying to say that there are any 
underlying ‘principles.’” Precisely. But the Court and rulemakers have made such a mess out of 
things in this area that “principles,” according to the law, must underlie the gang terminologist’s
translations. The governing Rule requires a threshold showing, for every expert witness, that the 
witness has used reliable “principles,” has considered appropriate facts and data, and has reliably 
applied the “principles” to the facts and data.223 In other words, the perfume sniffer and the gang 
terminologist must identify reliable “principles” that they have used, and they must show that 
they have applied these asserted “principles” reliably to certain “facts” that they have isolated. 
This is a silly idea, of course; it cannot be done, because the perfume sniffer’s honest answer has 
223
 Fed. R. Evid. 702.
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to be, “I didn’t use principles; I just sniffed it.”224 And yet, principles are what amended Rule 
702 and 703 require. The rule drafters would have done better to leave the Rule alone and to 
recognize the limits of their understanding, emulating the modesty of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
On the other hand, it is entirely possible for a trial judge to recognize a purported expert 
opinion that is so misleading that it should not be admitted. As the Fifth Circuit explained in a 
pre-Daubert case called United States v. Johnson,225 a trial judge would be on sound ground in 
excluding the opinion of an identification expert to the effect that he could discern the hair color 
of a subject from the subject’s fingerprints. The Johnson court, however, upheld the admittance 
of evidence that a certain substance was imported marijuana, offered by a government expert 
named de Pianelli, who testified that he could determine this fact from “the experience of being 
around a great deal [of marijuana] and smoking it.” De Pianelli did not use “principles,” but 
rather applied his (apparently extensive) experience to the case facts. The court held that the 
opinion of an expert should be excluded if it was “inherently implausible,” a label that could be 
applied, it said, to the hair-color-from-fingerprints opinion, but not to de Pianelli’s opinion about 
imported marijuana.226 I do not think that the trial judge in Kumho, who excluded the opinion of 
a tire-defect technologist about accident causation, rendered a decision that improved on this 
“inherently implausible” standard, nor did the Supreme Court with its follow-Daubert-but-not-
really approach in its Kumho opinion.
Daubert purported to liberalize the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. It 
emphasized the tendency of the Federal Rules to admit contested evidence, so as to allow the 
224 See Crump, Daubert 15-16.
225
 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978).
226 Id. at 1362.
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jury to decide in cases of doubt.227 Perhaps the greatest irony of the Daubert decision, however, 
is that Justice Blackmun’s elaborate structure of nonexhaustive exhaustive criteria, and his 
examples about fit that were not examples about fit, have produced exactly the opposite result. 
Daubert and Kumho have made the admissibility of expert evidence much more difficult. Every 
case of significance, today, requires Daubert hearings. These hearings are expensive; prior to 
Daubert, they rarely were necessary at the pretrial stage.228 The criteria for expert witnesses 
involve multiple hoops to jump through, as is evidenced by an article by a scholarly judge, Judge 
Harvey Brown, titled Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses.229 The evidence must pass by St. Peter at 
the pearly entrance230 eight separate times.  Although this is certainly not Judge Brown’s 
intention, it is the necessary implication, in an adversary system where lawyers properly use 
every available tool not only to prove their own cases but also to destroy their opponents’. By the 
end of a Daubert hearing, in fact, it is not uncommon for even an intelligent judge to have lost 
his or her way in the resulting maze. I recall one case involving a financial expert—a forensic 
accountant—in which the judge became concerned with the question whether the underlying 
principles had been peer reviewed and ultimately ruled that the opinion should be excluded 
because the proponent’s legal theory—not anything about the financial opinion at issue, but the 
legal theory to which it assertedly was relevant—had not been peer reviewed(!) 
In comparison to this sort of practice, the simpler but more precise test that the Fifth 
Circuit applied to de Pianelli’s marijuana opinion in United States v. Johnson, depending upon 
whether the opinion is inherently implausible, sounds more on target. Better yet, the test might 
227 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89.
228 See Crump, Daubert 1.
229
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230 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that gatekeeper role should not 
be restrictive like “St. Peter at the gates of heaven.”
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depend upon an application of Rule 403: admit the evidence unless its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by counterweights such as its tendency to mislead, confuse, or consume 
undue time. A judge who does not aspire to become an amateur scientist cannot hope to do better 
in difficult cases.
Beyond this, Daubert itself proposed some good solutions to the problem of unreliable 
expert evidence, solutions that did not require exclusion.231 The jury has the ability to reject 
evidence, including expert opinions. Jurors in many cases are more suspicious of experts than 
lawyers are. Also, cross examination of an expert expressing an unreliable opinion helps to 
expose it as such. The opponent can offer opposing experts, too, to debunk the offending 
opinion. Furthermore, grant of a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law is also a way for 
the judge to control the result. And finally, a Rule-403-based decision to exclude the evidence 
can be made if it is so discernibly unreliable that its probative value is outweighed by confusion, 
tendency to mislead, or undue consumption of time. This kind of judgment can be made at the 
pretrial stage in an appropriate case, through a motion in limine or for summary judgment. But 
the pretensions of judges to an understanding of intricate questions about the philosophy of 
science, such as their attempts to apply the abstruse and shifting concept of falsifiability that 
Popper advocated (which the Supreme Court transmogrified), and the efforts of judges to be 
smarter than experts at their own expertise, are so dysfunctional that the Rules requiring these 
standards should be abolished in favor of simpler substitutes.
V. AUTHENTICATION: SHOULD THE DOCUMENT 
OR OBJECT ITSELF SUFFICE?
Authentication requirements are another set of rules that sometimes increase the cost of 
trial for dubious purposes.  Recently (and quietly), Arizona relaxed certain authentication 
231 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
64
requirements in divorce cases.232  The decision was based upon a perception that litigants who 
appeared in court carrying report cards or medical records were unlikely to do so fraudulently.233
Many of these litigants act pro se, it appears, and even in cases with counsel, the waste 
associated with the need to produce live authenticating witnesses from schools and doctor’s 
offices probably outweighs the value of the authentication requirement.  I would have asserted 
that this kind of authenticating witness was not necessary to begin with and that the litigant 
herself could supply the predicate,234 but it is the nature of rules of evidence to be confusing, to 
produce unpredictable exclusions of good evidence, and to invite judges to impose requirements 
beyond those that the rules call for.235  A competent attorney would naturally feel this concern 
and would bring in the outside authenticator whenever possible.  Arizona’s decision, to 
recognize that this cautious (and wasteful) approach usually is unnecessary, is a step in the right 
direction.
The basic authentication rule is that real or documentary evidence is admissible if 
supported by evidence “sufficient to support a finding” that it is “what its proponent claims.”236
The requirement does little to protect much of anything.  It is among the lowest proof burdens 
known to the law.  If any reasonable juror could believe that the item is likely authentic, the 
judge must admit it.237  Evidence to the effect that “It looks like it” or “I just recognize it from its 
232 See Arizona Makes Family Courts More User-Friendly, ABA J., Jan. 2006, at 38.  The change is conditional: 
“Either party can invoke the full rules at any time, but unless parties object, the looser rules will apply.”  Id.
233
“Most of these things are unlikely to be tampered documents.”  Id. at 39.
234 Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) says that authentication consists of “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter 
in question is what its proponent claims.”  A parent who has received a report card in regular form at about the right 
time can meet this minimal standard.  See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
235 Cf., e.g., supra notes 48-55 (discussing decision in Frechette v. Welsh).
236 See supra note 234.
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“Once a prima facie case [of authenticity] is made, the evidence goes to the jury, and it is the jury who will 
ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence, not the court.”  United States v. Carriger, 592 F.2d 312 (6th
Cir. 1979).  This conclusion follows from the nature of the jury’s role.
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overall appearance” is enough for admissibility238 or, at least, according to the rule it should be.  
But the low standard in the authentication rules does not keep them from imposing costs that 
outweigh their value.  Authentication requires a witness: for each document source one more 
individual whose bodily presence the lawyer or litigant must produce.
Again, the law in this area is at variance with every other method of careful 
decisionmaking.  If a law school considers the application of a prospective student, it does not 
require the student to bodily present an employee of the student’s undergraduate college to vouch 
for the authenticity of the student’s transcript and withstand cross examination about it.  
Similarly, the admissions committee would accept a letter of recommendation from a justice of 
the state supreme court because of its regularity of appearance, without summoning the justice to 
appear personally before it and swear that, yes, this is indeed the judge’s letterhead.  It is not that 
fraud is impossible in such circumstances, and surely there have been cases of doctored
transcripts or recommendation letters.  Instead, the decision not to insist on personal 
authentication reflects a judgment that its marginal contribution to fraud prevention would be 
insignificant while the costs would be unreasonably cumbersome.  This reasoning is similar to 
the thought process that led Arizona to eliminate some court-imposed authentication 
requirements.239  Subject always to the judge’s exclusionary authority under Rule 403, I would 
advocate the repeal of the authentication requirement in other contexts as well.
VI. THE REMAINING RULES IN THE 400 SERIES: 
RELEVANCE AND COUNTERWEIGHTS
238 Cf. United States v. Thomas, 38 M.J. 614 (U.S.A.F. Ct. Mil. Rev. 1993) (holding that witness’s recognition of 
general appearance of exhibit, consisting of paper bag containing drug paraphernalia, was sufficient authentication; 
further, holding that failure to object did not render counsel ineffective because authentication was sufficiently 
clear).
239 See supra note 233.
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The 400 series is one place where I would retain many of the rules intact. The 400 series 
concerns relevance issues, or the probative value of evidence balanced against counterweights 
that serve other policies. (The repetitive-behavior evidence rules are different in nature because 
they involve the treatment of what I believe is a proper inference, the human tendency to repeat,
as inherently improper, and so I do not treat them here even though those rules appear in the 400 
series, but rather I have discussed them in a previous section.) The remaining rules in the 400 
series, then, include Rules 401 through 403, which provide for a general balancing of relevancy 
versus counterweights,240 and Rules 408 through 412, which sacrifice relatively small amounts of 
probative value to serve extrinsic policies including encouragement of settlement, protection of 
remedial measures, safeguarding of generosity in paying medical expenses, the insurance 
relationship, and the privacy interests of a sexual assault victim.241  These rules operate almost in 
the manner of privilege principles.242 They are debatable in the same way that every rule is, but 
my arguments for abolition would not apply to them.  For purposes of this article, then, I shall 
treat Rules 408 through 412 as being retained in substantially their existing forms, as well as the 
cores of most privilege rules.
Rules 401 through 403 are the heart of the relevance-counterweights balance, and I would 
retain these in modified form. What would the modifications be? Well, first, I believe that the 
definition of relevant evidence is too indiscriminate. Elsewhere, in another article, I have argued 
that the definition of relevant evidence in Rule 401, which includes any information that has 
“any” tendency to nudge the outcome either way, provides no standard.243  Taken literally, it 
240 Fed. R. Evid. 401-03.
241 Fed. R. Evid. 408-12.
242 They rest on “social policy considerations akin to privileges, that is, to encourage certain conduct regardless of 
whether the excluded evidence is ‘good’ evidence or not.”  PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN et al., supra note 83, at 345-46.
243 David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1997).
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means that all information of any kind whatsoever is “relevant” to any issue anyone can name,244
although it is not usually applied in this manner, of course.245 In some instances the “tendency” 
will be uncertain and infinitesimal, but even an uncertain and infinitesimal influence qualifies as 
“any” influence. The result is that the Rule defines relevance so that there is no such thing as 
irrelevant evidence.  This is why Rule 40l contains no standard.  Rule 402 provides that 
irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, and thus the drafters must have intended for there to be such 
a thing as irrelevant evidence, but the definition that they provided gives us no way to recognize 
it.
The drafters of these Rules considered two models of relevance before deciding. The 
Wigmorean concept required at least some minimum degree of probativity as a condition of 
relevance.246 If the inference depended upon indefinite, multiple chains of reasoning, and if it 
was so slight that no reasonable juror could have used it in making a decision, the evidence was 
not relevant, according to Wigmore. The drafters rejected this definition and instead opted for the 
Thayerian model of relevance. Thayer defined relevant evidence by the “any tendency” 
approach, with no minimum degree of probativity required.247
The result is that Rules 401 and 402 are non-rules when taken at face value, insofar as 
exclusion is concerned. Instead, the more meaningful business of exclusion is done by Rule 403.  
For many kinds of evidence, this approach is satisfactory. Rule 403 tells the court to balance the 
probativity of the evidence against counterweights that include prejudice, confusion, misleading, 
244 See Id. at 9-14 (arguing that “literally irrelevant” evidence is impossible under the Rule 401 formulation).
245 See Id. at 14-19 (arguing that judges exclude what they call “irrelevant” evidence without focusing on the Rule).
246 See 1A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AND AT COMMON LAW § 28, at 969 (Peter 
Tillers ed. 1983).
247 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 
530 (1989); see also Fed. R. Evid. 401 Advisory Committee’s note (explaining the adoption of the logical relevance 
standard).
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cumulative evidence, and undue consumption of time.248 Rule 403 contains an unevenly 
weighted scale, however; exclusion results only if the counterweights “substantially outweigh” 
the probative value.249 This part of the Rule, too, functions appropriately, because it admits the 
evidence and trusts the jury if the probativity is significant and if the question of its relative value 
compared to prejudice or other counterweights is close. Rule 403 is an appropriately designed 
instrument to exclude truly bad evidence while preserving a policy of liberal admissibility of 
useful information.
But there is one important instance in which Rule 403 does not, by its terms, perform its 
function, and it is here that the non-standard of Rules 401 and 402 matters. Specifically, Rule 
403 does not exclude evidence of very small, tangential relevance, if the counterweights are also 
small. If, for example, the evidence is so remote that its influence on the issues is low, then it has 
low probative value, but for the same reason, it probably has low prejudice and other 
counterweights too.  We cannot use Rule 403, as written, to exclude evidence that has little 
connection to the issues, because although its probativity is low, so are the counterweights—and 
it is the counterweights that exclude, according to 403.250
There is one further factor that is important here, and that is the strategic importance that 
the use of low-relevance evidence may have to lawyers.251 Particularly if a lawyer has a bad case, 
the skillful use of low-relevance evidence can enable the lawyer to distract the jury from the 
issues, to exhaust witnesses so that cross examination will make them appear less credible than 
248 Fed. R. Evid. 403.
249 Id.
250 See David Crump, supra note 243, at 19-20 (explaining this result with examples).
251 See Id. at 20-25 (arguing that, contrary to the obvious conclusion, lawyers feel powerful motivations toward 
offering irrelevant evidence).
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they are, and to pursue other strategies that are at variance with the cause of justice.252 Although 
it is no longer recent enough to make its details leap immediately to mind, the criminal trial of 
O.J. Simpson is an example. The defense cross-examined some witnesses over periods that lasted 
more than nine days each.253 No witness can undergo this kind of adversary process without 
exhaustion and without making unintended statements that derogate unfairly from credibility, 
and no jury can retain the issues over the resulting length of trial. The use of low-relevance 
evidence, gnawed at as a dog gnaws at a bone, is a tactic for carrying out this strategy.
My solution, then, would be to modify Rule 401 to insert a Wigmorean threshold as a 
condition of relevance. I would advocate a low standard, to preserve the policy of liberal 
admissibility, but not so low as to enable attorneys to produce a year-long trial that should have 
been a fraction of that duration, as the Simpson lawyers did. To the “any tendency” language, 
then, I would add a qualifier: the tendency must be “sufficiently significant, when combined with 
other evidence, to have the potential to affect the decision of a reasonable juror.” If any 
reasonable juror could combine the evidence at issue with other evidence to make a difference, 
the evidence is admissible, but not otherwise. This is a change from the current regime, which 
sets no minimum standard for relevant evidence. In other words, I believe Wigmore was right, 
Thayer was wrong, and the Advisory Committee was wrong in following Thayer.254 At the same 
time, the proposal of a low standard means that the judge must defer to the jury, and indeed to 
the most credulous possible juror who can be labeled “reasonable.”  This proposal is not likely to 
exclude evidence that is meaningful. What it will do, however, is provide the court with a better 
basis than currently exists for eliminating delay and distraction from the trial. 
252 See Id. at 26-46 (explaining these uses of irrelevant evidence).
253 See Id. at 32-39 & n. 185 (analyzing the “witness control or debilitation function”; describing lengthy cross 
examinations).
254 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, I would amplify Rule 403—amplify, rather than modify. The Rule 
should explicitly state that the reference to a tendency to confuse, to mislead, to produce 
cumulative evidence, and to cause undue delay, empowers the court to exclude any kind of 
evidence so unreliable that its probative value is substantially exceed by these counterweights. 
This power should explicitly extend to unreliable hearsay, expert opinion, character evidence, 
and object authentication, as well as to all other evidentiary issues. The abolition of categorical 
rules against these kinds of evidence, then, would not mean that thoroughly unreliable evidence 
would be indiscriminately admissible. The difference would be that the mechanism of exclusion 
would depend upon a decision by the court that a piece of hearsay evidence is so bad that its 
relevance is substantially outweighed by counterweights, rather than upon a blanket rule such as 
the rule against hearsay.  Rule 403 should be clarified, then, to refer explicitly to particularly bad 
hearsay, and also, to unreliable expert opinion, overly prejudicial character evidence, and highly 
dubious authentication, and to explicitly authorize their exclusion.
VII. GENERAL CONCERNS: STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR, 
OPPONENTS’ POWERS, AND THE SCARCITY OF 
JURY TRIALS
A. “Don’t Try”:  The Elimination of Jury Trials as a Result of Our Rules
Why, then, should we remove so many of the Rules of Evidence?  The decline of the jury 
trial has become well publicized—and to some, is alarming.  Professor Gross and Dean Syverud 
have documented the phenomenon in their article titled, “Don’t Try.”255 Their message is that 
although we revere jury trial, we do not act upon that attitude.  Instead, our policies silently tell 
litigants, “Don’t try your lawsuit,” because we create heavy incentives to prevent them from 
doing so.  Since Gross and Syverud’s study, the phenomenon has progressed to the point that, in 
255 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 1 (1996).
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2002, only 1.5 percent of civil cases in federal courts were resolved by jury trial.  This tiny figure 
represents a nearly two-thirds reduction from 4.3 percent during the 1970’s.256
What is most alarming about these figures is the question that they do not answer.  That 
question is, “What has happened to the cases that once were resolved by jury trial, but now are 
not?”  It seems clear that a larger proportion of cases than ever before are resolved by judges in 
matter-of-law rulings: by summary judgments, dismissals, or sanctions, for example.257 Do we 
really want judges wedging more cases into judge-controlled matter-of-law dispositions, rather 
than by decisions that take the facts into account?  If not, we should take a hard look at our Rules 
of Evidence, which are one mechanism that drives the length and expense of trials and therefore 
increases the judge’s need to be disposition-minded.  At the same time, some of the disputes that 
would have resulted in trials during the 1970’s probably are settled instead.  The mechanism by 
which this result occurs is more mysterious than that for dispositions by judges.  But a fair 
inference, and a disturbing one, is that some of the increase in settlements may be judge-driven 
too.  It seems probable that judges, whose dockets have forced them to become more disposition-
minded today than ever before, have taken to inferring which party has prevented a negotiated 
resolution and to promulgating strategic pretrial rulings designed to induce that party to act 
reasonably—by settling.
Most of the rules of evidence are aimed at protecting valid policy goals.  Resistance to 
abolishing the rules would sensibly focus upon those effects, and support for abolition must deal 
with that argument.  The issue that most often is overlooked, however, is the phenomenon of the 
vanishing trial.  Rules of evidence make the process unpredictable, and certainly they make it 
256 See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, 88 ABA J. 24, 27 (2002).
257 It seems likely, for example, that adjudications for missing time deadlines may have increased.  Cf. DAVID 
CRUMP et al., supra note 2, at 484 (containing notes about this method of disposition).
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longer and more expensive.  The proposal for abolition proceeds not only from a judgment that 
the rules cost more in lost accuracy than they provide in putative benefits, but also from the 
strong possibility that they are a significant cause of the reduction of trials and the increase in 
their cost.
B. Strategic Behavior by the Judge:  Does It Include Imposing Disadvantages upon 
Recalcitrant Parties?
The issue of expense is rarely explored in Evidence courses.  Some hearsay exceptions, 
for example, require unavailability,258 which is defined in such a way as to drive up costs grossly 
disproportionately to any conceivable gains.259  Students, or for that matter rule drafters, rarely 
perceive these effects from study of the text of the rules themselves.  Of even greater concern is 
the possibility that the judge’s rulings (or refusal to make them) can balloon these costs.  Judicial 
rulings can even confront recalcitrant parties with evidentiary costs as a means of precipitating 
settlement.  This possibility is even further removed from the imaginations of evidence students,
and possibly from those of policymakers as well.
In an effort to get the point across in my evidence course, I use a series of images.  
Following coverage of the hearsay exceptions that require unavailability, I invite students to 
consider what their effect might be.  My first image excerpts the definition of that term, 
“unavailability.”260  I then offer a not-so-hypothetical situation.  A lawyer representing a witness 
informs the judge that the witness plans to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination and to 
refuse to testify.  Is the witness “unavailable”?  Imagine that we have former testimony from this 
witness, which is usable only if the witness is “unavailable” by reason of privilege;261 is the 
258 See Fed. R. Evid. 804.
259 See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
260 Fed. R. Evid. 804(a).
261 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1).
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witness unavailable because of the witness’s lawyer’s representation to the court?  “Yes,” say the 
students without hesitation—erroneously. “No,” is my immediate response.  What else does the 
rule say must happen?  Usually, even as they stare at the rule, most students miss the point.  I 
project the image of an unfriendly looking judge.  At length someone recognizes that in addition 
to other requirements, the judge must rule on the claim of privilege before unavailability 
results.262  That is difficult for the judge to do without context, at the pretrial stage, and without 
the witness present.
My next image is that of a stack of $20 bills.  Money.  “What does this slide have to do 
with it?”  More blank looks from my students.  “Well, okay; here’s the next image.”  I project a 
subtraction on the screen:  “$20,000 - $30,000 = -$10,000,” and I explain that in our hypothetical 
case, the amount in controversy, which represents a loss due to forgery, is $20,000, but bringing 
the witness to trial will cost an estimated $30,000, because the witness is incarcerated in Idaho.  
The light begins to dawn.  It may be that the only way to use the witness’s hearsay, even though 
it is former testimony that was fully cross-examined by the opponent, is to bring the witness to 
the courtroom: a step that will produce a $10,000 loss even if we win the verdict and recover 
100% of our damages! Viewing the unavailability requirement this way highlights the argument 
that the rule is of doubtful wisdom.
“No problem!,” most students still happily maintain.  In law school, the judge is the hero.  
The judge of law student imagination always makes enlightened rulings.  So: “Won’t the judge 
recognize the problem and provide a pretrial ruling?”  Not necessarily, is the answer; just getting 
the court coordinator on the telephone and attempting to persuade him or her to give you a 
hearing may be impractical for a question of this kind, in some quarters.  Besides, the judge may 
262 Fed. R. Evid. 804 (a)(1).
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deliberately decide not to issue any ruling before trial.  Why?  I return to the image of the 
unfriendly judge.  And then, the next image is a dialogue.  YOU: “Your honor, will you give me 
a pretrial ruling recognizing the witness’s privilege?”  THE JUDGE: “No.”  The students now 
face a decision: bring the witness, guaranteeing a $10,000 loss, or run the risk that key evidence 
will not be admissible.  Some students remain convinced that this cannot be the effect of any rule 
anywhere.  But it is precisely the effect of this rule, in this situation.
Why would a judge rule this way?  Decisionmaking capacity is a limited resource.  
Judges develop a facility for concentrating their rulings on issues that advance their cases toward 
resolution.  They simply must exercise this facility, or they will be unable to do justice at all.  
Sensible judges attempt to ration decisions about discovery, for example, and they try not to 
consume unnecessary time with pretrial rulings about evidence.  If that is not enough to explain 
the refusal, some judges are meticulous.  They want everything assembled before they make 
rulings.  This kind of judge may want the witness brought in as a means of “being sure I’m doing 
it right.”  In insisting on this wasteful procedure, the meticulous judge is not responsible for 
doing the math that leads to a $20,000 - $30,000 = $10,000 loss.  And finally, it may be that the 
judge has already decided that the proponent of this evidence should settle this case.  The judge 
thinks that, rather than being greedy, the proponent should accept $5,000 instead of full damages
of $20,000.  Therefore, without articulating this rationale, the judge refuses to rule—as a 
subterranean strategy for forcing the plaintiff to deal.  The complexity of the rule, and its 
insistency on unnecessary multiple criteria as a condition for allowing former testimony, create
the mechanism.
C. Strategic Behavior by Litigants: The Proponent’s General Preference for Live Testimony
and the Opponent’s Power of Compulsory Process
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Strategic behavior by litigants is another factor that counteracts the risks that underlie 
some exclusionary rules. What would evidence proponents do, if they knew they could use 
hearsay statements instead of live witnesses? What would their opponents then do? 
Consideration of these questions illuminates some of the issues surrounding rule abolition, 
especially in the area of hearsay. Analysis will show that strategic behavior by litigants will 
result in reduction of some of the risks that underlie the hearsay rule.263 In other words, 
inferences about strategic behavior by litigants will generally support the argument for abolition 
of the hearsay principle.
First, it should be obvious that a party entitled to rely upon hearsay will not necessarily 
omit to call live witnesses. Reading hearsay to the jury is boring and not very impressive. Almost 
always, the proponent of the evidence foregoes some of the impact of the evidence by doing this, 
as well as some of its credibility.264 Therefore, even if hearsay were freely allowable, we should 
expect litigants to present live testimony from witnesses with crucial information that requires 
full absorption by the jury, as well as witnesses whose credibility is crucial, unless there is an 
overriding strategic reason to the contrary.265
The assumption must be, however, that sometimes the proponent will choose for forensic 
reasons to forego live testimony in favor of purely hearsay presentation, if allowed to do so. The 
proponent will have decided that strategic concerns make the use of hearsay, in this case, more 
persuasive than a present witness. In this situation, however, the opponent is not without remedy. 
If the opponent wants the witness, the opponent has the same power of compulsory process that 
263 Cf. supra Pt. IIB of this Article (discussing hearsay risks).
264 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
265
“Many declarants will be subpoenaed by the prosecution or defense, regardless of any Confrontation Clause 
requirement.”  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 (1992).
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the proponent does.266 If, for example, the proponent presents hearsay that is a dubious 
representation of the witness’s testimony, the opponent can call the witness live, to put the 
evidence in context or even to contradict it. If the witness is not credible—if the witness cannot 
present a coherent story in response to questions—the opponent likewise can bring the witness in 
by the power of compulsory process to demonstrate this lack of credibility.  In fact, the Supreme 
Court has relied upon this right to compulsory process as an important corrective to the risks 
inherent in admitting hearsay. In other words, the Court’s decisions are premised in part on the 
conclusion that hearsay evidence is more readily acceptable, and carries fewer disadvantages, in 
light of the opponent’s ability to present the witness live if the opponent does not.267
In fact, one can argue that the real abuses that led to the hearsay rule, such as the trial of 
Sir Walter Raleigh, did not reflect misuse of hearsay nearly so much as denial of compulsory 
process. When the Crown used the affidavit of his alleged coconspirator Lord Cobham instead of 
Cobham’s live testimony, Raleigh’s objection was based not so much on the offensiveness of the 
affidavit as upon the refusal of the court to allow Cobham to be produced at Raleigh’s request.
Thus, Raleigh pleaded with the court, “But it is strange to see how you press me still with my 
Lord Cobham, and yet will not produce him.” Cobham, he pointed out, was present “in the 
house hard by, and may soon be brought hither; let him be produced, and if he yet will accuse me 
or avow this confession of his, it shall convict me and ease you of further proof.”268 The court 
refused Raleigh’s request for compulsory process on multiple grounds: Cobham’s confession 
was firm, the circumstances supported it, and a retraction might result in falsehood, which would 
be prejudicial to the King.  The court explained, in a passage that sounds strange to modern ears, 
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 See JON R. WALTZ & ROGER C. PARK, supra note 83, at 97.
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“. . . for, having first confessed against himself, and so charged another person, if we shall now 
hear him [Cobham] again in person, he may, for favour or fear, retract what formerly he hath 
said, and the jury may, by that means, be inveigled.”269
The most serious error of the court in Raleigh’s case, then, concerned the absence of 
compulsory process.  The message is simple.  When the declarant is available, the real issue 
concerns, not the risks of hearsay, but rather, the risks of suppressing the ability of the opponent 
to call the witness. That, and not the hearsay problem itself, was the issue of deepest concern in 
the case of Sir Walter Raleigh.
The dueling strategies of opposing lawyers in this situation, then, can be summarized as 
follows. 270 The proponent will likely prefer to call the witness live in many if not most instances 
even if the prospect of using hearsay is available. The exceptions to this preference will fall into 
at least three categories. First, presenting the live witness may be expensive in comparison to the 
value of the case. Second, the witness’s testimony may concern an issue that is tangential, that is 
unlikely to be contested, or that is merely cumulative. Or, third, presenting the live witness may 
produce unwelcome or even contradictory testimony, or it may destroy the witness’s own 
credibility. In the first two instances, it seems likely that the opponent will decide not to use 
compulsory process to produce the witness.  But if preventing the live witness is impractical 
because of considerations of cost, tangential importance, or lack of genuine controversy, it is 
hard to see what is lost by the incurring of the asserted hearsay risks. In the third case, in which 
the live witness will contradict the evidence or appear noncredible, the power of the opponent to 
produce the witness by compulsory process would come into play. If cost considerations are not 
prohibitive, the issue is significant, and the opponent could reduce the impact of the evidence 
269 Id.
270 See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
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meaningfully by having the live witness present, the opponent would be expected to call the 
witness.  Thus, the rational strategies of the parties , by themselves, will mitigate the hearsay risks
when they are significant, even without a rule against hearsay.
There are remaining problems, however. One of the most significant is the possibility of 
spoliation. The proponent of the evidence may be motivated to secure the absence of a 
noncredible or inconsistently helpful witness in favor of using hearsay from the witness instead. 
This is a valid concern, but it already exists with respect to all litigation. In fact, isn’t it entirely 
possible that, in Leake v. Hagert, the father encouraged the unavailability of the son, or even 
arranged it?271 This kind of spoliation, in fact, is probably one of the unseen costs of the hearsay 
rule:  the possibility that, with the rules as they are, a party can prevent the opponent’s use of 
good evidence such as that in Leake v. Hagert by arranging unavailability.  The hearsay rule, in 
other words, itself encourages a mirror-image kind of spoliation.  In any event, spoliation is a 
self-limiting strategy, because spoliation authorizes an inference against the spoiler.272 We 
probably do not catch every instance, but the party who uses it risks the loss of everything, and 
this possibility provides an important countervailing motivation. In addition, there are the other 
protections we have analyzed earlier in this article, which already exist or could be put into 
place: the jury has an innate sense of suspicion about hearsay; we can enhance that suspicion if 
we desire, by an instruction; we can require a knowledgeable witness who can discuss the 
hearsay risks to be presented live for cross examination; and we can even, if we want to be 
271 See supra Pt. IIA of this article (summarizing this case).
272
“Spoliation of evidence . . . is admissible to show consciousness of guilt.”  United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 
F.2d 76, 78-79 (6th Cir. 1986); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 4.4 
at 162-63 (3d ed. 2003).
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particularly careful about hearsay-based results, reinstate the common law rule providing that 
hearsay is insufficient to support a verdict.273
VIII. ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLES:  PRESERVING THE 
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY BY SETTING 
REASONABLE LENGTHS FOR TRIALS
So far we have considered existing rules.  Changing existing rules, however, would allow 
us to have new and different principles.  If we limited the adverse impact of the rules, for 
example, we could do more to ensure that trials were not so scarce and expensive.  Professors 
Arthur R. Miller and Geoffrey Hazard once participated in a report that suggested that a rule 
could be adopted so as to limit the longest trials to no more than ten days.274 These two 
gentlemen are heavyweights, but the proposal radically departs from our traditions in the United 
States. On the other hand, it has been reported that in Great Britain, the birthplace of our right to 
jury trial, a murder case can ordinarily be concluded in a day.275 Have the British adopted rules 
that shortchange accuracy for expeditiousness? It seems doubtful; England is a sophisticated 
democracy, one that values individual rights, although not precisely according to American 
standards. If Britain can do that, it ought to be possible, in America, to try a jury trial for almost 
any case in less than ten days—if, that is, we revise our rules of evidence to eliminate the waste 
that they now produce.  In fact, there are indications that American lawyers might support 
serious restrictions on trial lengths.  At a symposium sponsored by the ABA Litigation Section’s 
Vanishing Trials Project, “some participants suggested an ABA resolution recommending time 
273 See supra Pt. IIE of this article.
274 See SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION & THE SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL 
OF LAW, CONFERENCE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: REPORT 2 (1995) (Arthur C. 
Miller, discussion leader, and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., reporter).
275 Shepton Mallet Prison in Somerset, http://www.richard.clark32.btinternet.co.uk/sheptonm.html.
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limits on trials,” and there was “a remarkable consensus with regard to the need to create 
efficiencies in the trial process.”276
In other words, one of the pleasant results of abolishing the rules of evidence would be 
that we could take seriously the limit on jury trial length that Professors Miller and Hazard 
participated in proposing. Then, we could expect people who now cannot serve on lengthy cases 
to be available for jury service. We could try big cases in a period that would let the jury focus 
on the issues. We could adjust the lengths of smaller cases accordingly, with the hope that a 
small case—by which, regrettably, I mean one with less than $ 100,000 in controversy—could 
be tried at a cost that would not exceed what is at stake.
A rule to effectuate this policy might be difficult to draft, but here is an effort. Rule 609 
now provides, “The court shall exercise control over the mode and order of interrogating 
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective 
for ascertainment of truth, (2) avoid undue consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment.”277 That is the present rule.  An additional sentence at the 
end of Rule 609 could provide, “For a very complex case, the court shall exercise this control by 
the imposition of time limits on witness or overall presentation by each party so that the expected 
or anticipated overall length of evidence presentations does not exceed ten [or twenty-one, or 
thirty] days, and for cases of lesser complexity, the court shall exercise this control to produce 
trials of reasonably proportional lengths.” 
I have no pride of authorship in the specific length of ten days.  I took this figure from the 
proposal participated in by Professors Miller and Hazard, although they too seem to be flexible 
276 See Stephanie Francis Ward, “Vanishing Trials” Issue Won’t Go Away, ABA J. E-Report December 19, 2003 
(publication pages unavailable for this publication).
277 Fed. R. Evid. 609.
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about the exact time length to be called for. The limit could be twenty-one days, or one month, 
and it still would produce the desired result, albeit to a lesser degree. The rule could also build in 
greater flexibility for cases in which it is needed: “At the conclusion of the time planned for any 
given witness or for overall presentation, the court shall grant an appropriate extension upon a 
showing that the ascertainment of truth will thereby materially be enhanced.” Also, “In deciding 
upon any request for extension, the court shall take into account, among other relevant factors, 
the time consumed by objections or argument interposed by the opponent.” And if that is not 
enough, the rule can add: “In an unusual case, upon a finding that the ascertainment of truth may 
be impaired in a complex trial by a time limit of ten [or twenty-one, or thirty] days, the court 
may excuse the parties from a time limit of ten [or twenty-one, or thirty] days and set a longer 
time that it considers necessary.” Courts have on occasion imposed time limits.278 The only real 
innovation in the proposals offered here is the requirement that it be done generally and that a 
specific target length be considered. 
CONCLUSION
Why is it necessary to consider these issues? Because, in a nation that purports to revere 
jury trial, a result in which only 1.5 percent of civil cases are resolved by juries279 is an 
embarrassment. Because rule drafters have so often and so thoroughly ignored this issue.280
Because the resulting trials are wasteful. Because a judge who allows a straightforward murder 
case to occupy a full year in trial is not following the requirements of rule 609 as presently 
278 Cf. Blumenthal v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. Rptr. 509, 515-17 (Cal. App. 2006) (holding that mistrial based on 
two-day limit for trial of marriage dissolution case was an abuse of discretion; discussing propriety of time limits, 
including five-hour limit for a “short cause” in California).  The court added, however, that it was unaware of any 
local rule of court either placing maximum time limits on any trial or empowering the judge to impose such a limit.  
Id. at 517.
279 See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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written, with its injunction against undue consumption of time, and because a judge who allows a 
witness to be cross-examined for nine days (or for that matter, even for a considerably shorter 
period) has forgotten the requirement that harassment of witnesses should be prevented.281
Because trials are too long for most people with responsibilities to serve as jurors, because they 
cost too much for most people with modest disputes to be able to try economically, and because 
a jury cannot be expected to focus the case reasonably after a trial has dragged on for month after 
month.282
The reform of the vanishing trial will not be possible, however, with our current rules of 
evidence.  The rules make it difficult for counsel to convey background material effectively.  
They make some kinds of issues impossible of proof with reasonable expense.283  In fact, the 
cumulative time that evidentiary objections and arguments consume is itself so lengthy in an 
average trial that even if the rules did not have the effect that they now have upon the availability 
of information to the jury, the length of trial would still be greatly expanded by the processes for 
rule enforcement.284
The current rules are arbitrary.  The hearsay principles are a clear example,285 although 
the same criticism applies to rules excluding repetitive behavior evidence, expert opinions, and 
objects depending on authentication.286  The hearsay exceptions, as well as the definition of 
hearsay, are full of irrationalities.  For example, imagine a hearsay statement that meets all of the 
requirements for a dying declaration (or “statement under belief in impending death”).  If the 
281 See supra note 253 and authority therein cited.
282 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
283 See supra Pt.IIB of this article (discussing proof issues in Leake v. Hagert).
284 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
285 Cf. supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (arguing that excited utterance exception admits evidence 
precisely because it fits criteria that make it less reliable).
286 See supra Pt. III-V of this article.
83
victim dies, and the charge is murder, the Federal Rules admit the hearsay pursuant to this 
exception.287  If the victim merely lapses into a vegetative state, however, so that the charge is 
aggravated assault or attempted murder, the technical aspects of the exception are not satisfied, 
and the evidence must be excluded.288  There is no difference in the rationales for admissibility,
and this result is nonsense.
Each of these exclusionary rules purports to prevent some disadvantage associated with 
perceived unreliability.  The rules do so inconsistently, however; and more importantly, they are 
unnecessary to achieve their purposes.  Again, the hearsay rule is an example.  Arbitrary rules 
exclude good evidence, as the dying-declaration example above shows.  Furthermore, the 
purposes of the rule in protecting against the hearsay risks of perceptivity, qualification, 
sincerity, expression, and bias would be better served by other means.  First, there is no reason to 
assume that jurors will be any less capable of evaluating these risks than they will be in the case 
of live witnesses.  In fact, it seems more probable that jurors are properly skeptical of hearsay 
generally.289  Second, if we are concerned about that issue, we can require a jury instruction 
pinpointing the risks and telling jurors to evaluate the evidence accordingly.  Third, if that is not 
enough, we can require the proponent to produce a witness who can be cross examined so as to 
expose the precise hearsay risks.  Fourth, we can provide that hearsay is insufficient to support a 
verdict and thereby require a substantial component of live-witness evidence.290  Fifth, we can 
rely on the strategic interests of the adversary attorneys: the proponent will not generally rely 
287 Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b)(2).
288 The evidence is admissible only in a civil case or a criminal homicide case.  Id.
289 See supra Pt. IIC of this article.
290 See supra Pt. IIE of this article.
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upon hearsay alone for important points but will produce live witnesses for forensic reasons, and 
if the proponent does not, and if it is strategic to do so, the opponent can.291
A blanket rule of this kind is anomalous, furthermore, because no one would make a 
major decision in any other field without substantial reliance on hearsay.  No one would make a 
major purchase or sale, employ a key employee, or admit or become a law student by refusing to 
rely upon written statements made by absent third parties.  To the extent that the Constitution 
requires exclusion of certain kinds of evidence, particularly through the Confrontation Clause, its 
restraints must be strictly observed; but even in criminal cases, a blanket exclusion that affects 
even reliable, non-testimonial hearsay is unjustified.  The dying declaration exception above is 
illustrative of how irrational, and how full of arbitrary requirements, our rules have become.
The same can be said of other exclusionary rules.  In the area of expert opinion, for 
example, the Supreme Court and the rule drafters have made a pluperfect mess.292  The character 
evidence rules that eliminate propensity evidence, and that eliminate references to repetitive 
conduct, actually exclude good evidence that jurors are perfectly as capable as lawyers to 
evaluate.  Worse yet, by purporting to distinguish proof of action in conformity from inferences 
of intent or identity and by admitting the latter, the rules are internally inconsistent and produce 
arbitrary results.293  Even requirements of authentication are so costly despite their adoption of 
one of the lowest standards known to the law (and therefore, their failure to provide much 
protection against unreliable evidence), that at least one jurisdiction has partially eliminated 
them.294
291 See supra Pt. VIIC of this article.
292 See supra Pt. IV of this article.
293 See supra Pt. III of this article.
294 See supra Pt. V of this article.
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Rules 401 through 403 are a sound basis for eliminating evidence whose probativity is 
greatly exceeded by counterweights.  The modifications suggested here would also eliminate 
relatively inconsequential inferences, and they would expressly require the court to exclude 
evidence so unreliable that it should not be admitted.295  This kind of calculus is a more reliable 
guide to the achievement of the purposes of the rules than the current regime, with its 
impenetrable thicket of hearsay rules and exceptions, our internally inconsistent and irrational 
principles governing repeated behavior, and the shifting complex of confusing criteria that the 
Court has mandated for expert opinion.  A standard that depends upon an excess of unreliability 
over probative value would be simpler and more precise than our existing rules.  It would 
function less frequently to exclude good evidence on bases unrelated to its merits.  It could be 
applied expeditiously.  It would result in more trials of more manageable lengths, or, more to the 
point, it would enable us to adopt rules requiring the advocates to get to the point.296
As Americans, we frequently want everything both ways.  We want government that 
provides extensive social services, but at a reduced cost in taxes.  We want terrorism eliminated, 
but we respond to the fulminations of politicians against practical means of detection by the 
National Security Agency of terrorist communications.  Similarly, we also want to eliminate all 
possible risks of unreliability from trial evidence, while hoping that juries can decide cases 
accurately and expeditiously with whatever happens to be left.  And we expect that we can 
preserve the right to jury trial while adopting procedures so cumbersome that they reduce the 
proportion of jury trials to unacceptable levels.  It is time for us to stop pretending about these 
last two issues.  We cannot ignore the disadvantages created by cumbersome procedures, 
295 See supra Pt. VI of this article.
296 See supra Pt. VIII of this article.
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including our rules of evidence, and at the same time hope that we can achieve consistent results 
while reversing the trend toward the vanishing trial.
